if f^ h l^ ^'
^V ,> ^r ^*- ^1 >•
7^ T-, ;n
■i '^: ^^- f:
•v^r4 ^^
i*. .# ^^^■
^^ -v ■#• : .»:
4^ > >3h I
4' *<' .4f *' •*' *^ ^- *•
•i=' 'K >>*
|
k' |
'^. |
•^" |
'f |
|
i- |
■i^" |
^i^ |
'^ |
|
% |
^'k |
^k |
•* |
|
• 1 |
•..*" |
^ |
'A N
EXAMINATION
Of the late Reverend PRESIDENT
E D W A R D s's
' Enquiry on Freedom of Will ;*
More cfpecially the FOUNP \TlON PRTN"-: CIPLE of his Book, w ^ TENDENCY,
and CONSEQUENCES^^ ..e Reafoniog therein contained. ^ ,
IN THREE
pS.rts.
Part. L Of the fappofed connexion of volitiqa with the higheft motive,
PAViV II. Of the indif- fo'uble conae£ltoa of mo- ral caufcs and efFc^s.
*
Part IIL Mora! libeF-^ ty belongs to moral agents. Or Mr. Edwards's neceffi- ty, if true in theory, is not applicable to pra^ice*
With an APPENDIX, containing a fpecimen of coincidence between the principles of Mr. Edwards's Book, and thofe of antient and modern FATALISTS.
Seek not after thai which is too hard for thee^ £kii& fearch not into things that are above tlsy Jlrength.
SONofbiRACH,
// ;; not of him that willetk.
St. PAULi
BOSTON:
■printed by Daniel K?jeeland, oppofit? *the Court-Houfe in Queen-Street, fir Tkom.^ .Leverett, in Cora-.Hili, .M>D£CjLxx«
PREFACE,
f rrVlE puzde ' attending difputes on fncK X kind of lubjcas as Mr. EDWARDS's •book treats of-, is probably the principal rea(()a why n3 animadverfions on his difcourfe have been yet publilhed. It was prefumed, that fe\T vrho might read it would beftow attention enough fo undcrftand it ; and of thofe who fhould aiten- JKively read and underftand .it, few would admit its foundation principles. The author of the pre- fent examination is not without apprehenfion, thiat the rcafon, which hath difliiaded others, will be thought fufficient to have difTuaded him, froni fuch an undertaking. He acknowledgeth that he Kvas difcouraged with only reading this elabo- rate and intricate performance /ome years fince. yet from the great reputation of Mr. Edwards ^ 5^nd prevalence of his dodtrine, he came to a re- jblution of giving this book another and attentive reading : In confequence of which, the following ^remarks were drawn up ' the motive 'of his *prefenc 5vricing ' and publication * is a perfuafion of the falfhood of Mr. Edwards^s * fcheme -, and this perfuafion * he * grants and fees is neceffary," he f cannot help this judgment. ' ^ And as he hath po manner of doubt but the foundation princi- ples of the book before him are falfe, fo he efteem? |hqm of moft dangerous tendency.
^ J*5kfon on hum?n liberty, ia «ifvv;«c to Cato's letter?;
iv PR E F JC E.
In a fpeculative and metaphyfical view, the fulj- jeft hath been largely difcuffed by fome of the ableft writers. The reader may be afTured, that as little metaphyfical reafoning as pofTible is ufcd in the following pages. For fuch reafoning the author hath neither abilities, inclination orleifure; befides that there is no great occafion, and that, he perfuadts himfelf it would not be edifying. His principal aim is to conGder the fubjeft iri z fra5iical view. In ibis view of liberty and ne- cefTity there is no puzzle, whatever difficulties at- tend the fubjedt when confidered abftradly. • Thc^ inquifitive may find a fuHanfwer to the principal arguments of Mr. Ed'u:;ards[s book, fpecnlatively copiidered, in Dr. Samuel -Clark^^ Gemonftrati- on of the being and attributes of GOD, in ahfwcr to Holbsy Spiyi'oza, znd their followers; in th^ fame learned v/riter's replies to papers from Mr. Lethnitz^ and remarks on hir.- Collinses book oni human liberty -, in Jackfpn\ defence of liberty againft Cato's letters, and vindication of the fame fubje6l in anfwer to Collins, To whom the author gladly refers, as having faved him a tafk to which he pretends not to be equal. Others might be mentioned, who have anfwered fimilar argument?
|wo thoufand year? ago.
< ' ' '
xAlS we are immediately confcious of liberty, as it is a truth of the higheft importance, no embar- rafiments in theory attending the admifTion of it, can oblige us to give it up — cfpecially as the de- nial of It plungeth us into a deeper labyrinth. The human intelieft'is Imperfe^l ; cqnfequendy, things may be confillent though vve cannot f(^c J?P':c'. The principal pu rpofc meraphy ficks cart .fcrve on pradical fubjc6ls is to obfcure them.
P R E F AC t. V
Mr. Edwards indeed profefleth himfclf an ad- vocate for liberty. Had he profeffedly denied ir, ihe author would not have engaged in this intri- cate difpute : For he eftcems the denial of iiberty a like abfurdity and extravagance as the denial of ^motion ; or a material world ; botk which have been denied, and the contrary pretended to be demonilratcd, again ft the univerl'al experience of mankind. Thofe things which no man can deriy ^without impeachment of abfurdity and extrava- Ijgahce ; it feems abfurd to attempt a formal proof ^pf. Should a man, for example, endeavour to convince one who might require a ftririg of fyl- Jogifrris to prove, that the fun fhines in a clear day, at twelve o'clock, he would have a very idle 'imployment : Let him that queftions it open his eyes, and he cannot want convidion. Let a man look into his own breaft, and he cannot but per- ^ceive inward freedom^ — Inward freedom — For if ^Freedom be not in the mind^ it is no where. And liberty in the mind im^plks/elf-delermimllon.
This y^/Wof liberty our author denies. In this fcnfe of liberty alone hath he any controverfy with the writers he oppofeth. His difagreemenc with Lord Kaims, -f is rather in words than any thing real, notwithftanding what our author hath pub- lifhcd to fcreen himfelf from the imputation of be- ing in the fame fcheme. Their general reafoning is the fame. They reafon on the fame princi- ples, and only differ about the meaning of the .^ord ueceffity, and a ifew other words and phrafes. Mr. Edwards affirms, that every volition and mo- ral adion is determined by a moral neceflity, which is as abfolute as natural s and that moral habits
arc
J Author of the cflays on the principles ofnioraiity and natural religion*
tl P M E F A C g;
are owirrg to the nature of things. He allows ort-f ly o^ external liberty, fuch as is the cfFedt of nc- cefTuy in the will — and eonflantly denies a powef of felf-determination. Lord Kaims and Mr. Hume affirm, ' that nian hath, in no cafe, a pow- er of rdf-deternninaiion •, but is, in all his afliondy determined by a moral neccflity' — which neceffity they hold to be as real as any other. The only difference is, that Lord Kaims, while he allows that GOD has implanted in man's nature an in- vincible feeling ot liberty, maintains, that this feeling is fallacious : And Mr. Hume denies the fubfiftence of any fuch relation as we fignify by the words caufe and eiTeft. But whether liberty, as maintained by Mr. Edwards, be not altogether hypothetic, may appear from the following pages. And as to his notion of caufe and of effed, when- ever he ufes the former word for any antecedent^ or the occafron of an event or thing, and the latter for the con/'::que7tce of another thing (as he tells us he fomctimes doth, p. 58. 59. jhe fo far agrees with Mr. Hume in words as well as ftnfe.
The author hath only given the outlines of fome ( among many other) arguments which oc- cur'd to his mind to evince the afped Mr. Ed-- wards's fchcme hath on the rnoral perfedbions and government of GOD, and its confequenc pradlical tendency. Had he enlarged on them> it would have lengthened out the enfuing exa- jnination much beyond what cither he or Che reader would chuie. The number of pages is, now double to what he at firft defigncd. He hopes for the patience and candor of the public; to whofe opmion he fubmits ihefe remarks. If they are juft, they need no apology •, if not, no apology can be of any fcrvice* if any Ihould * " " fuppofe
:P:R E F AC E. vli
fuppofe that in .one refpefl.at left an apology Ihould be made, viz; for undertaking to criticize the writings of fo diftinguiftied an aurhor as Mr Edwards •, the aniwer is, that if the par- ticular defign of the propofed examination is properly purfued and executed, and that refpeft preferved which is due to the charat^er of * gentleman of Mr. Edwards's merit and cmi* nence, the author hath no: tranrgreffed : But of thefe he is not himfelf a proper judge ; though he hopes to be acquitted (in the lat- ter of thefe reipc6lscfpecially)by everyone chans. Whatever reception his performance may meet with, he is confcious of the redicude of his .•wn intentions.
ti i««liill|iiM«l
CONTENT; 8
T H E C O N T^E N T S:
Introduction, exhibitirg a general view of
Mr. Edwards's fcheme ; with the defrgn and mc^ thod propofed in thefe remarks.
Part 1. On the conncdion of volitron with the highed motive.
Sect. I. Mr. Edwards hath not fhewn where- in the ENERGY of motive confifts.
Sect. 11". The will not neccfiarily determined by the higheft motive.
Sect. III. Exfernal ad:icn not determined by the will, upon Mr. Edwards^ fcheme.
Fart JL An examination of Mr. Edwards^s doflr'ns refpcfling the indiiToluble conne^^tion of moral caufcs and efTedt'S. -
Sect. I. Whe-ther the v^ ill be nccefTmly de- termined by an exfrwjjc caufe.
Sect. II. Or by an inirr/i/ic cziife.
Sect. III. Upon Mr. Edwards's own fcheme,. there cannot be natural liberty without moral.
Sect. iV. Of GOD's being ths author of fin r upon Mr. Edwards's fcheinc of nectlTiiy ; and irv what fenfe he admits this to be the confequence cf his do6>rine.
'Sect. V. On thz{\:x'^'^o{^A advantage of mcY><il evii to the univerfe.
Sect. VI. Cohidi\n\ng gemral ohfcrvations and vffflrpfiom on the Icheme of ncceffity CAhibited in Mr Edwards's bock.
Part ITI. Shewing that moral liberty, asdiftin- pruilhed from natural^ belongs to moral agents : Or admitting Mr. Edwards's fcheme of neceflir)' to be true in iheor)\ it is not applicable to pradice^
Sect. 1. i«/fr;7^/liberty belongs to moral agency.
Sect. II. Jnternal liberty confiitent with the influence cf motives, &c.
Sect. IIL Mr. EJw^r^j's neceflity, if true in theory y r.ot applicable io tra8ice.
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION.
"Exhibiting a general view of Mr. Edwardsh Icheme ; with the defign-aiid method propo- fed in thele remarks.
IT IS quite befide the purpofe of the following remarks to encjaire, Whether th^ general icheme of doftrlne Mr. Edwards intended to eftabliHi in his enquiry be rational and fcriptu- ral. It is only the foundation principle we aim to confider : The lylkm built hereupon, whether true or falfe, is nor, by the generality of Cal- viniftic Divines, made to depend on the fame bafis.
The principal fubjed of the book before 135 is, ' What determines the will ?' And through the wh;:>le performance great pains is taken to demonftrate, that moral ncceffity and liberty arc convertible terms. The perplexity, confufion, and uncertainty, which difquifitions of this fort are attended with, is fufficiently known. We fhail endeavour to keep out of the clouds as much as the nature of the fubjed v/ill admit.
'The pofition of chief importance,Vwe are told is. That the loill is necejfariiy determined by the Jirongeil motive ; meaning- by the ftrongeft mo- tive * that, which, m the mind's prefent viev/., hath the greaisll appearance of good.* ' Every ad of the will hath a certain fixed connedioa rlicreA'ith, and depends hereupon, as it*s caufe — -
V INTRODUCTION.
or ^he ground and rcafon of it.' ^ In fuppor-t of which it is faid, that 'nothing ever comes to pafs without a proportionable caule- — that the adts of the will, and material things, have a like necellary dependance on a caufe without them- felves— that moral caufes may be caufes in as- proper a fenfe as any caufes whatever — and morai ii^celEty may be as abfulute as natural.' f
Indeed, by the word caufeMr, Edwards ex- plains himfelf to mean, not only' that which Jiath a pofnive efficiency^ or influence to produce a thing, or bring it to pafs i' but ' fomctimes any antecedent, cither natural or moral, pofitive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or the manner and circupr.flance of a thing, fo de- pends, th^t it \^ ihc ground and reajon^ in whole, or. in part, why it is rather than not ; or why it is as It -is, rather .than oiherwife.' J At the fame time he aiTerts, that every ad of the will is an '.effect neceirarily dependent and confe- quent on a. caufe, which he calls an efficient caufe ; to whofc' determination and command volition Js as m\^c\i fubje^^ 2iS the motions, of the hands and feet to the volitions which determine and command them — that the a£ts of the will are as '' paffive with reipedl to the antecedent caufe, ground, or reafon of them.' § He maintains, upon the whole, an univerlal neceffity — that all beings, all even s, the m^anner and ail the cir- cumiianctrs of things are neccfisrily determined. Yet he proftfTcth himfelf an ad/ocate for liberty, and labours a dillindion be:ween natural and
moral
=♦ Enquiry part i. k£\. 2. t Enquiry p. 30, 40, 48, 58, 01, 06, '^<^ pafTi.u. X Enquiry p. 57, 5S,
I N r R 0 D UC no N. .^5
.moral ncceflity, which diftinAion he apprehends
important — natural necefTuy being incGnfiftenC
with praife or blame, while moral is nor. The
liberty he admits is, however, merely external,
;.and the refult oi neceffity in the mind.
This is a general idea of his plan, fo far as it will fall under prefent confideration. I;i purfu- ^ ing our remarks on which, we fhall.
First, Examine the fuppofed connedloxipf vvolition with the higheft motive.
Secondly, The indiflToluble conpedlion of J moral caufes and effedls, i
Thirdly, Shew thart internal, moral liberty, ,as diftinguilhed from . external, or natural, be-, longs to moral agents 2 Or admitting Mr. Ed- waras^s fcheme of necefllty to be true in theory^ it is not applicable to praofice. It is alfo pro- pofed to add, in an appendix, a fpecimen of coin- cidence between Mr. Edwards and fqme celc- ibrated infidels, antient and modern.
N. B. We have made ufe of the Lond»n edi-
t tion. Wherever the reader finds particular pages
referred to by numerical figures inclofed in a
parenthefis, fuch place in Mr. Edwards^s enqui-
;ry is meant, unlefs notice is given of our reter-
ing to Tome other author.
^ART
PART I
On the 'Connexion of Volition with the ihlgh- ,efl Motive,
SECT. I.
Mr. Edwards hath not fiicwn wherein the entr- gy of motive confifts.
THE enquiry in this place is not, Whether the higheft^notive hath always a caufal influence on the will ? But, admitting this to be the cafe, v/hat it is that caujeth any fuppofed mo- tive to he higheft in the mind's view ? wherein doth its energy^ or power confift ? In the next ledlion, we fhall examine, whether the will is jndeed determined, in every a<^, by the highcft .motive*
«
When, between two or more 6bje6ls in the mind's view, one appears mofl: agrea'ole \ (from whatever caufe,) this appearance is the highcft or flrongetl motive, according to our author. Now as there is a manifctl difrerence between an objeft's a 51 unliy appearing molt agreable, and the caufe of this appearance ; the proper quefiion, in the firft place, is. What is the ground, Teafon, or cauftt of the agr.?able appi-arance ;//^//. For admitting the ftrorg-ft motive to be the more immediate caufe of volition, how doth this prove ;that it h the original caufe ? IVhcnce is it that any propofed objctt hata the gr».^ate[l appearance of ^Qod ? From what caule ? t-iicher we muft w///-
r. On iBe Ccnne5lion of Volltm'
mately recur for the ground of volition ; [PcfTibfy not ftop here] Till ihcanfwer to this quefticn is found, the original ground of volition is not dif- covered. For if every circumftance of things hath an anTwcrable caufr; then there is a caufe why this or that motive is highcfl. ^
Though Mr. Edwards fuppofed the refoluti- on of this queOion was * not nectfTary to his pur- pofef,' J: yet he hath, in feveral particulars, re- marked what he apprehended may ' have in- fluence' in caufing ' the objediS of volition to ap- pear agrcabie to the mind.* He i-fTigns, for in-
fiance,
* *In the quefiion, Jir/>fl/ deicrmines the uUI ? it is ta- ken for grsntcd, ihzt /cmethtrg dcteimir.cs it. And the controveify on this head is, where the fcurdation of the will's determirsation is,' (p, 56. ) MT.Eduards faith cxprcfly, ' That the aft of volition itfeif (or the will ) is always determined by that in the mind's view of an objcd:, which ccufes it to appear moft agreable.* ('p. 11 ) Here, then, is the foundation of the will's determination. Mr. Edwards's bufmefs, there- fore, according to his own ftate of the qutftion, wa», to point out what caufeth an cbje^ to appear moft agreablc. For if that which causeth //)/; appear^ ance be the real caufe of volition, then the agreablc appearance itself cannot be the caufe. Thcagre- ab!e appearance, or highcft motive, as he cbfcrvcs, is nothing dijUn£i from volition, but the very things as will be particularly (hewn in the ncxtfeftion. We would here juft hint, by the way, that Mr. Edwards hath given ample teftimony againft * the pofition of <?hicf importance in bis difcourfe.* For that the highcfl motive doth not always determine volition, is pretty apparent, if it is always determined by that in ©r about an object which caujeth it to be, and appear^ moft agreable. The will, in no inftancc whatfocver, is determined by the agreablc appearance, but by tho
- caufe of fuch appearance, + p. 12,— I ^,
Cn ihe Connexion of Volition ^
jKance, * the apparent nature and circumftances of the objcd — the manner of the mind's view of it — the ft ate of the mind, by nature or educati- on— or the fcame it is in on a particular occafi- .on.' But how is thi^ any anfwer I Doth not the queftion immediaccly arife, i^^fi; comes the ob- ject to have fuch a particular appearance to the mind I Whence is it apparently circumftanced as it is ? Whence doth the mind view it in fuch a particular w^w»(?r ? Or from fuch a particular /W^^ of it, whether ' faint, or clear, ftrong and lively ?' Whence is i\xt fiate^ temper y ox frame of the mind what it is ? Until thcfe things are fblved, the queftion, Whence is it that ' a pcrfon's pleafure is wrong' or right ? hath received no anfwer, unlefs ' a very impertinent one.'
* There is no great difficulty, faith Mr. Ed^ v^ardu in fnewing, not only that it mufi needs ht fo^ but alfo how it is fo^ that the mmd muft be influenced in it's choice by fomething that hath a preponderating influence upon it.' * But if 'a preponderating influence on the mind* implies that ibe choice is already made^ it may *be a matter of no fmali difficulty' to fhew, how the mind, in making it's choice, can * be influenced by fomethtng that hath a preponderating influ- ence upon it.*
While writing the firft part of his book, Mr. Ed'-J^ards feems to have been fenflble, is was no very eafy matter ' to ftiew how it is fo^ or why, that the mind is always determined by the high- eft motive. His words are, (p. it.) * Particu- larly to enumerate all things pertaining to the mind's view of the objsdts of volition, which
have
'wilh the kighejl Mcti-ife,- ^
have Influence in their appearing agrrable to the iHind, would bs a matter of 770 Jmall d:ffiaih\y and might rtquiie a trcatifc by itltlf, and is not ne- ceflkry to my pfefent purpofe.' But (v/ithout tarrying to reconcile i\-\\% fetming contraft)is this a matter attended with greater difilcuhy, or of lefs importance, or would it requir'e a larger trea- Tjla, than to fiiew, what determines the will to this fide, cr that ?
We allov'vv that '?h^ commm people do rot af- ccnd up ivH ili-ir refit clions and abilradions to the mttaphy/ical Jources^ relations and dtpendencits of things, in order to form their notion of faulci- nefs— They do not wait uW they have decided by their refinin^s, what firft determines the will ; whether it bs determined by fomething extrinfic or intrinjjc. If this were the cafe, mul- titudes, yea, the far greater part of mankmd, nine hundred and ninety n'me out ofathou- iand would live and die v/ithout having any fuch notion as that of fault ever entering into thtir beads 5 or without {o much as once having any conception, that any body was to be either blamed or commended for any thing. They do not take any part of their notion of iauic or blame from the refolution of any fuch q-efti- ons.' *^ A fuller acknowledgment M.r. Edwards ■ could not have made, that the erand queftion, the main fubjedt of his book. What determines the will ? is a fubtle and unprofitable one. We are therefore at a lofs for the motive of his wri- ting an elaborate volume to determine a pjinc not to be determined — at lead, by his own de- claration, of no life to one sut ef a ihoujmi of mankind.
C P. 19> 4-9^.
"4' On the ConneBien of Volition ■
P. 39, 40. Our author obferves, that ^ into the meaning of the Vv^ord liberty \s not taken any thing of the caufe or original ot choice — how the pcrfon came to have fuch a volition ; whether it was caufed by ib me external motive, or internal, habitual bias •, v/hether it was necefiarily connec-: ccd with fomcthing foregoing, or not connedled. Let \hz perfon come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he i§ able, and there is no- thing in the way to hinder his purfuing and ex- ecuting his will, the man is fully and perfectly flee, according to the primary and common no- tion of freedom'.
It hence appears, that Mr. Edwards edeem- ed it neither recenary nor ufeful for us to know the caufe or criiin of the will's determ^ination— * how a perfon comes to have fuch a volition.* And yet it was a main point in his view to fhevv, that the (Irongelt motive is the immediate caufe of every ad of choice. Now, as was before ob- ferved, it is juft as neceflary and important to know the orighial and ultimate^ as the next and more immediate caufe of volition. The nexc and immediate caufe is but the effedV of fome/>r^- ceedi?2g caufe -, this of another, and fo on. 'The determination of the v^iil, faith Mr. Edwards, fuppoferh an effed, which nmfl have a caufe. If the will be dettrm'ined^ihtxQ mud be a determiner^ ^ Granted. And if the ilrongeft motive be the determiner, this alfomuft be determined by fome preceeding caufe. There is a caufe or reafon of its being ilrongeil — fomething from which it de- rives, and wherein lies, its great flrength. If therefore, it was of any impciranGC CO Ihcw, (con- formable
* P. ?;
wiii the higheft Motive, 5
■formable to Mr. Edwards's defjgn) what deter- mines the will, and to provs thaC the flrongefl: motive doth in •, it was at leaft of equal impor- tance to pomt our, v;hat it is that caufeth fuch moti/e to be, or appear, (irongefl:. The real caufe of volition is not found, till this matter is explained. The enquiry is not purfucd to the end, and the plan ot Mr. Edwards*^ book buc -^alf executed,
' Suppose a chain hung down out of the Hea- vens, frO;Ti an unkncjun height,^ and although •every link of it gravitated tov/ard the eanh, and what it hung upon' was not vifible, yet it did not defcend, buc kept its fituation : And, upoa ^ this, a ^quelcion fhould arife. What fupporred or kept up this chain ? Would it be a Tuakicnc anl.ver, to fay, that the/o^, or loweft link hung upon the fecond, or that ntiit above it ?* without proceeding to fnsw what the iecond hung upon: ; ' or rather, iht firfl and fee on d together ;' and lb on, until it was found ' whac fupported the sfjhols. Thus it is in a chain of ciules and ef- fects. The lall or lowed IS 7'^//)^;jr/t'ii upon the cauf- above it. This again, \^ it be. not the firil caufe, is fufpended, as jm efiecl, upon • fome- thing above it, &i\''^ The original (thdc is, the tru: and reel) caufe of volirion is,- therefore, yet t,o be explainedi For if it b,^ liie immedi- ate eitecl of motive, (liU this caufe is an effcdl: in regard to f^iieihing preceeding—and v/hatever is ih.:;,n:-xt or imo-)CJ!ate caafe ot the iirenofth or energy of moti^'e iilclf, this sgain is an tfiVct in relatjoii 10 a eaufc prcc.cjing, as wi:ll as ,a
""^ Wslla/li'ty p. ^$7.
'$ Cm the'Connefilcn cf Volition
canfe ni relation to motive— And thus the en* qurty ma.y .be purjued in inf.nilwtn. (Which fhevvs, by the way, x.htfuti!:ty^:M leall, of entering en fuch an enquiry as that which is the fubjed of Mr. Edzvardy^ bo«ok ) S.-iould ir, be faid, tiiat the energy of motive, in t:very cafe, is t3 b^ at- tributed tothe Erll and fuprcme cauie, as ihe im- mediavc tlTicient-^rh^s, -'kideci, is making (liort work •, but it is cutting the knot, rather thaa untying it. Haweve-s whc,n jt ihall.be {hc-^\n, that e/ery atlof will, in every creature, is an im- mediate, neceflary effect of the fa premecaule, the aif]^:u:e will at once be at r.n endc
'^ The vulgar noihr, of blan^evvorthlnefs, fays Mr. Edwards^ is, a perfon's having his he.irc wrong, and doing wron^ -frum the heart ' ^ Now hath he :flievv'--n, ivhince a .perfon's heart comes to be wrono; ? He tikes nonce ofchis de- fed in' the Piithor of the efTiy on the frecaoqi 0L the w^ll in GOD and the cr<?araTes,' that he had not given a rcafm why cm cM of the will is^ er why H is hi this manner, rather than another^ -^ Now haw hath Mr. :Edwards lupply rd this de- fed ? is what h? hath faid^ a reaibn why an a6t of the Vvriil is, or why it i • in ihis manner V Sup. pofe ihe higheit n,:.Gi:ive decermines the v/di, he Cviplains motive to be the apparent good in an objedt — Now what is it thfit makes, or caufes an •objec:r to appear good ? For this, by his own principles, is what deterGi:nes the will. He ' fpeaks of a certain jcvereignty inniorive, v^here- by it has power todefcrmine volicion. Wherein c-onfiils ' t-iis fuppokd .fov^reigniy r' From whac
c^ule
**P..2^S. .t P. 71,:^:
witly the hlghfc Moiivi] ;^
Oiifc doth it proceed ? From what * excrclfe' of it can either its Ibvereigncy, or its caufe, be in- ferred ? * ' And To the queftion returns in in-^ finituniy and the like aiifwer mull be made in in^^ finitum? For granting that an objed's appear-^ ing agreable to the rnind is the ground of the mind's choice, what account is this of the agre- sble appearance icfcif ? Is it a r^afon why aa (!)bje6l appears beautiful or deformed, agreable ©r difagreable •? Doth it fhcw us^ -why ' it is Ji'joil agreable .to fome men, to follow their rea- son I and to others, to follow their appetites ?* Not at alL Nor coBfequently, doth it (hew us ' wherein confiils the (Irength of motive'-—* whence the motive that determines the will is prepollcnt— jf what antecedent caufe its deter- mining power is tihc.efiv<fl. Every circumftance of things, ic is pleaded, mud ha.ve a caule. Vo- iicion then is the effjcit of motive — the latter the f.fed of foine prior caufe-^this of another — and this again of another, idc. &'c. &c. Where then .are we to feejc far the true and, original caufe of va^olition ?
Although Mr. Edwards eurforily pafletK thQ QueRion, Wherein confilts the energy of mo- live ? as befide ' the purpcfe of his difcourfe j* yet we moll think, that his main ' pofition,' and ' the thing of chief importance' upon his fcheme, abrokitely required a clear ' eKplanatioa' and full difcuflion of this -queftion. It is the hinge, on ;ivhich the controvCi fy, as Hated by Mr. Edwards^ muft finally turn. He appears to have been :fcrupul3us, whether he h.*d not ^failed in ex^
plaining
# On the Connexion of VoUtmt
plaining this thing,' from his hint that if he had, it did ' not overthrow the pofidon itfelf, which wai. the thing of chief importance' in his enqui- tf\ •* viz. That the will is always deterfnined by fitg firon^eft moiiveJ* "^ This pofition may noc be overthrown by a failure in ' explaining where- in the ftrength of motives confifts •,* but w« inighr have expected, and (hould have been glad £6 have fecn, a rationale of the pofition. If true, there is a caufc, g'-ound, or reafon of its truth. That caufe hath not been affigned, or difoovered to our apprchenfion. It is Toon ttiough to fay, v/hether the pofition is true cr laile, when the foundation of ic is underftood. But whether it hath a folid fupport, or is ever- ?krov?n by Mr. Edwards himieif, may appear in the following fedlion : We conclude the prefenc .mx\i this, remark.
{., Altkough we have no right to require an anf\i^er to fo fubtil a quedion as this [What de- termines the will ?J from any but fuch as under- take GJ their own accord to explain the matrcr ,; yet, from Mr. Edwards\ known abilities, ws might have expe£led a more fatisfadtory and ra- tional anfwer — efpecially as he feems to have 2jpprehended, that the general qnefticn conccrn- Inrg. liberty was thoroughly examined and de- cided in his difcourfe upon it. But fince, after what Mr. Edwards hath faiJ, it (lill remains ab- flrufe and undettrmined, we conclude ir mull re- main lo. . For no author we have fccn hath wrote upon the fubjed with greater ftrength. And we cannot but obfc-rvci thai Mr. Edwards
in
* P.
y»
Of.
mib the high eft Motivel r,^
in fome parts of his book, appears (o have been quite fenfible that no fubjcd is more intricate and puzzling than this concerning the determi-i nation of the will, confidered in a fpeculaiive view. Should any ' find fault, that we have gone into metaphyfical niceties and fubtilties ;' our reply is, that Mr. Edwards* % enquiry is * a me- taphyfical fubtilty, and muft be treated accord-;' ing to its nature.' t «.
^' 347-^
%•
S£CT.
^-O O^ the Cchmni'sn cf Vollficn
SEC T. IL
.The will not neceiTarily determined by. the ftrongeft ivlotive.
IT is not always the nature of the object:' /;? ;?- felf^ or ' what reafon dictates to be oelt, and molt for the perfon's i?<^/)^i«f/j, taking in the whole of his duration/ that is the ft r on ged mo- tive ; fince the di(5iate of reafon ' is o/ten over- come by the greater v;eight of other confidera- tions.^ And indeed were the diciate of reaicn always thfi ftrorvgeft motive^, and were the will invariably dttermined by motive taken in ih's fenfe, it is plain, that fm would never havs en- tered into the world. Now the preferableneis of the objed in its own nature, and as appre- hended by reafon, not being always t'he ground or caufc of its appearing moil agreable, buc fomething diverfe or contrary, in many inftan- ces ; the queiTion is, How came beings made \ipright to miftake their happinefs upon the whole ? For midake it they mud ; (by fuppo- fition) or otherwife in the /;y^ ad of fin they could not be determined by the greateft appa- rent good.
Here we may enquire, Whether In innocence any thing but conformity and fubjedlion to the Creator could appear to be the greateft good > If not, then, on Mr. Edit-ards's hypothefis, an innocent creature could never rebel. If, on the
^ther
* P. 17J
with the higheli Motive. it
other hand, rebellion againfl the fupreme caufe had the appearance ot the greaiefl: good to Mam in innocence, and to apoftale angels be- fore their fall, how doth this eonfift with the general opinion that hath been entertained of the original extent of their rational faculties, and the fpiritual image of GOD with whicii they were endowed ? The powers of intellect ifi innocent Adam^ for example, have been fup- pofed fo great, that confiftently herewith it can- not be doubted but he had the fulled view of duty, and of his higheft intered as connedcd with it ; and confcquenfly could have no appa- rent fuperior motive to tranlgrefs. If in in- nocence he could not hefitate but ic was his higheft duty to refrain from the forbidden fruit, he could not, (by .fuppofition) hefitate but fuch acl of forbearance was alio his higheft hap- pincfs. Therefore the greateft apparent good was to recain his integrity. Confcquentiy, ia tranfgrefiing, his will was not determined h)\ but againjl^ the higheft motive. Nor can we conceive of ^ prefampuous fmner, on any other fuppofition- — meaning hereby, one who a6ts zg'um^prejent convidtion---ov dire^ly in oppofuion to the light be hath in the very article of finning^
It will, perhaps, be faid, that innocent AdanC^ higheft good was to forfeit his integrity. And indeed, on any other hypothefis, the controver-, fy fcems to be brought to an iftlie, and the opi- nion of being always neceflarijy determined by the higheft motive given up. Now ftiould this be faid, (which is at leaft imply'd, if not expref- fed, in what Mr. Edwards hath remarked ^ on D ' "" the
* Part iv. Sc§. 9«
12 The will not neceffarily determimil
the advantage of fin to the creation) we might a(k, whether fin could appear moft agreable to an innocent creature from the nature of the ohjeo} in itjetf ? This, we prtfumc Mr. Edwcrds would not fay. And if it could noe thus appear from its nacure, it will l>i difficult to (hew how fia could b^, in any lenfe, the creature's highefl good — Or how an innocent creature could appre^ hend'ii to be fo. But whenever it can be (hewn, that innocent man, or rebel angels before their fall, had a fall view cf the fuperior advantages cf fin above innocence and righteoufnefs, we be- lieve no body will think it worth while to con- trovert farther about any doctrine of religion. An hypothcfi^i ioeAtraofiiinary, requires extra- ordinary proof. We (hall have occadon to refume this point under anoiher part of our reiiiarks.
I.H regarj to the fiiR entrance of fin into the. world, we acknowledge it is an eVenr, which alt denonVmaiions of p-rofefilng chriQ'uws are cq-ially ho)den to account for— yea, ddfts 2i% much as (hrillians. Even atkdfis are no ofhcr^'ife excu- fcd than as, by their principles, they are not obli- ged to account for any thing The truth is, no bLi^i can folve this matter. But if xhtfirH Jinfut volition was the necefiliry produdt of (he iiighelt motive \ then rebellion againll GOD was difcer- ned to be ihe highedgood, whsn rcafon andjudg' ment fy(e'y dilated and 2^QVirned) which they cer- tainly did whi.s the creature continued innocent* Yea, ic follows, that the higheft motive to the C/rJator^ as well as creature, was in behalf of moral evil. Hov/ then is fin fuch an vtfinit^ evil as we have been rciUght to belitve it } Does it n^ t turn out an i^^mi^ good ? Rather, how can chat d<;rcrve the name of^J;;, which appears
hy the Jircngeji Mollvu >g
ynxjft agrcaUt even to the Deity himfclf ? Or allowing fin to be the greatell evil, that man muft have an hard tafk, who un Jertakes to fhcw, that it is alio the grcaieCl good : And if not the" greattrt good, hosv k could have this appearance to creatures in a Hate of reditudt:— and even to Almighty GOD himfeif. Or if it could noc bave this appearance to any being in a Rate of rectitude, how v/as it then pofuble for beings niade upright to fall -, on fuppofuion that no infiance ot volition- cm be mentioned but what is the effcCl of, or determined by, the greateil apparent go')d ? The very idea of moral /<fr- feUion appears t ) be loft, if we purfue ta the end fuch an enquiry as Mr. Edwards hath led us into,
" That the will always follov^s the lad prac- tical judgment of the underilanding, hath paf- itA current as a ma.iim in the fchools : So thac if a fick man fhall, in contradidlion to his phy- fician's judgment, and his own, ind'jlge his ap- petite for mtat or drink, he mud be fuppofed previoudy to have convinced himfeif, that his pr..T^nt indulgence is of more value to him than his health, or even his life. If other men in- dulge their unreafonable inclinations at the ex- pence of intereft, reputation^ inward peace, and everlaftmg falvation, they muit be fuppofed to judge with themfelves, that this vicious indul- gence ought to be preferred to interefc, repu- tation, peace of conicienee, and evcrlafting fal- vation : This way of thinking, which palTcrth fo eafiiy with the learned, goes mighty ill djwn With m.^n of plain undcrdanding ; who, on the conirary, incline to believe, that in the pradtice of vice cucn ciUier do not think a; all; but aa
-like
14 ^he will not nerejjnrlly determined
like mere animals by the blind impulfe of ap* petite and afFedlbn ; or if they attend to what they are doing, that they bafely and ablurdly prefer a prcfent gratification to what ihcy know to be their moft valuable interefts 4n this life and the next.
The truth is, that man is a compound of ra- tional and animal afFcdions, that without at- tending to himfelf, fometimes the one, and at other times the other, ,rnuft of necefTity prevail, as they happen to be ftrongeil ;, and that, through the love of prefent pleafure, and aver- fion to prefent pain, or through mere pufillani- mity, we too often decline the combat ; and, in contradiction to our reafon, ourronfcienee, and all the mod weighty confiderations of honour and .inrerefl:, refpedmg this life and the next, fuffer the animal to prevail over the rational .affedtions.
For. the remedy, then, of this greateil of all .evils, it is not enough the judgm.ent be well in- formed, ; bccaule however dcfirous we are of having the authority pf our judgment for what- ever we do, and however much we will en- deavour to reconcile our judgment wich our in- clination ; yet when that cannot be done, we will too often purfue our inclination in contra- didion to our ju Jgmenr, The only remedy thercfoie under heaven is, to endeavour, by all means .in our power, to make our raiional a match, and, as much as pofilble, an overmatch, for our animal affedions : In which employ- jTjent we have a title to all the aiTiilance, which the teachers of xiiankind can afford us -, and to
ftimulatej^
h the flrongeft MotiDel i^
Emulate, direiSl, and fupport us in this ardu- ,ous tafk, Teems to be their chief bufimfsy ^
* The thing of chief importance in his dif-
courfc/
* Dr. OfwaJd^s appeal to common icnfe in behalf of religion, p. 156, 7, 8. margin.
« The perception or laft judgment of the underftand- ing, is as diftin^t from the actual e;>certion of the felf-motivc power, as feeing the way is from walk'^ ing in it» Nor will it follow, becaufe the percep- tion of the underftanding is denied to be the imme- diate, efficient, neccflftiry caufe of the exertion of the felf-motive power, that therefore umntelligent matter maybe capable of fel f- motion ; any more than it will follov/, if a man's eyes be denied to be the im- mediate, efficient, neceiTiry caufe of his walking, that therefore the man ipay be capable of walking, though he has neither legs nor life. A man's un- derftanding judges of what he is to do, as his iyes difcern the way. But a blind or winking man has power to walk without feeing. What refemblance is there between an aSiion^ and a perceptian of the Wiind ? There muft therefore be fome diftindl prin- ciple of motion and aflion, independent on the per- ceptive faculty. That * exertion which makes ac' tion to be a^ion is entirely a diflin£l thing from that perception ox judgment^ by which a man determines beforehand concerning the reafonabUnefs or iitnefs of what he is about to aft : An agent not afting ac- cording to the lafl judgment of his underftanding, is like a man {hutting his eyes, and walking at a ven- ture down a precipice.* (Dr. Samuel Clark's an- fwer to a third letter from a Gentleman of the Uni- verfity of Cambridge, annexed to a colle^ion of pa- pers between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Claris)
It fs no uncommon thing * for men to rM againjl ihe light, nat which they do, they allow not. The J2W in the msmb^rs warcth againftths iawin the mind.
Jiiftea4
l6 ^hs wl/l not mceffarily deter mmd
courfe,* M% Edwurd; tells us is this, * That the will is always determined hy the ftrongeft motive* This, he infifts, ' is the previous ground and reafm of every a^ of volition \ io that in the na- ture of ihin^s volition cannot take place without^ hut is connefled with it, as the producing, ef- yiciENT caujc* la this principle his whole
fcheme
—Video, mellera proboque ; Dettriora fequor. Infteadof fayingithatprefumptuous ofFenders followthe laftjudgment of their underjiandingywhen their thcughts the mean while accufe tkem^ it is more proper to fay, that they follow the didlateof /«//, pafflon, or appe- tite. Mr. Edvjards allows, that men cio not always. follow the dictate of r/^n : (p, 17) They there- fore fometimes follow the dictate of forne other fa- culty, diJlinSl from, and in oppofition to it. Mr. Edwardsy indeed, includes more than reafon and judgment in the phrafe, the dictate of the undcr- ilanding : But taking the unJetftanding in his fenfe for * the whole facultv of perception,* it is as difte- lent from animal affection and appetite as any two things can be. Ani ' \^ it/ict propriety of fpeccl; be infiftcd on/ a man muit be faid \o fo'low the. di(5tate oi that faculty which h.^.t!) il^e afcendant at any time ; whether it be the UM^erftindinii or linimai appetite : Otherwife we confound V\t ^'ift.rid-^ii between that faculty, in refpc<5t of wh^ch GOD hath taught us more than the bsafis of the fitid^ and the appetites he hath ^iven us in conimon with them.
* Inteu.igent beings vQi fometimes on the view oijitcng motivej, fomit mes upon -iveak ones, fometimes wnere things are abfolutely indifferent. In which laft cafe there may be very good reafn to fl^, though two or more w^vj <?/ sdtmg may be ab- folutely indifferent : Ihe Twtive^ or thing ccnfidered as in \\tw, is fometh'ng exirinfic to the mind. ] he 'tmprejjvm made upon the mind by the motive, is the perceptive quality^ m which the miad is piuQivc : The
doing
ly the ftrengefi Mctivel 1 7
fcheme is founded^ — (wlthcut having ihewn what it is that gives Ibcn^th and energy to the n;o- tive thac dercrmioes the .wili— what it is thac gives or confti-utes the agreable appearance in an objtd of iluiice — to whii*: t*)e prtpcDuerancy* or efficiency of it upcn the will is to be afcribcd) Let us enquire how this " pofuion of chief imr pcrrancc' is fupported.
As no authority can be of equal weight to overthrow this main pofition as the authors own, we beg the reader wou'd confider the following pafTage •, which is ^o full 10 our purpofe, thac we are faved the trouble of a laboured confu- tation of the principle alluded to. ' I have rather chole to exprefs myftlf thus, that the will always is as the greatelt apparent good, or AS what appears molt agreable, is, than to fay, that the will is determined by the greatefl apparent good, or hy what Teems mod agreable : Bccaufe an appearing mojl agreable ; or pkafing 10 the mind, and the mind's preferring and chu- fing, feem hardly to be properly and perfedly DISTINCT. If i\ndi propriety of fpeech be in- fifted en, it may more properly be laid, that the voluntary action, which is the immediate PRuiT and CONSEQUENCE of the mind's voli- tion
doing of any thing vpon and after ^ or in conff quence of that p<'rception, ti.is is the power cffelf-moucn^ or aaion — Which, in a!) animate agents, \s fpantaneity ^ and in moral agenti, what we call liberty. The not dijiir.guijhing thefe things, but confounding the /nc- live with \X\t principle oj at^icn, and denying the mind to have any principle of cMicn befides the motive^ is the ground of the whole error.* Papers between Mr* L(ihnit% and l^u Clark ^ p. 181 > 28 j.
1 8 ^ifg will not nscejarily deter mned
tio« or choice, is determined by that which* appears mqft agreabU, than tae preference or
choice ITS£LF.' "^
Here it is fully declared, that, ^ properly fpcaking,' voiition and the hightft motive are not DISTINCT things — that the former is only as the laiicrr, and not determined by it. Motiye cannot be the grouTid and dete/miner of volition,'' and at the fame time the a3t of volition itjelf. It is not the cauje of volition, but the things * if llrid: propriety of fpecch be infifted on.* In- Itead of the ftrongeft motived being the caufe of volition, the real truth is, that volition is the caufe of external d^ion. It is this only, ' wh^ch is the immediate fruit and conffqucnce of the mind's volition, that is determined by^ the ftron- geft motive. The reafon is obvious : ' For an appearing mod agreabie to the mind, and the inmd*s actually preferring and chuf^ng^ are not aij- tinot^ but thejame thing. * It is not, therefore, good fenic* to lay the former determines the lat- ter—^to ipeak of motive as the previous ground, reafon^ or cauje of the exertion of an ad of the will- — that volition cannot take place v/ithout this as the antecedent caufe. * It is not good fcnle tofpeak of volition as from motive — PROM THE INFLUENCE of the motivc^ and from the mflue^ice that the motive hath on the man for the production of an a6i of volition, ■\
V/hen Mr. Edzvards faith, ' it is the volunta-^ ry a^ion^ and not the will^ which is determined by the higheft motive,' there can be no doubc but he means corporeal adion : For thus he ex- plains
!!* P, llall, t P«l*2> I23?.
by the firongefl Motive: 29
plains himfelf, ' the voluntary aflion, which is iht fruit ^nd confiquence of the mind's voliiion or choice' — cxprelsly diftinguifhing it (as in the next following words) from ' the adl of voliti- on, or the preference and choice iifclf * Inftead of fhewing, therefore, (as he undertook; what determines the will, Mr. Edwards hath only la- boured ta prove, that the will determines the a£lions of the tody — For inftance, ' the will de- termines, by an ad of volition or choice, which way the hands ^nd feet fhali move.' * Bodily adlion is the ^<?^?, fruity conjequence of the will's determination, dependent on it, and con- neded with it, as its caul'e and determiner. The will itjelf\% exerciled m prefering, chufing, de- termining -, the body in thofe motions aiid ope- rations, which are tne effect of the will's deter- mination.
Thus volition being nothing diverfe fron?) the ftrongeft motive, but the fame thing with it — it being improper to fay, that the will is de- termined by the ftrongeft motive ; there can be • no fuch relation between' motive and volition ' as is fignified by the terms caufe and effe^^ We are ' brought to the contradi<::tion of a caufe and no caufe ; that which is the ground and rcafon of the exiftence of a thing, and at the fame time is not the ground and reafon of its exiftence' — (^p. 103, 103) the ftrongeft: motive *is dererminer and determined -, mover and mov- ed ; a caufe that adts and produceth eftcds up- on itfelf^ — (p. 7) * volition is from a caufe, and no caufe 5 the fruit of motive, and not the fruit
£ 9|
■ 2?. 474
sh ^he fvrllmt ncceffarily diisrmhed
of motive; the beginning of motion and eier- Eion, and yet confequeht oh previous exertion 5 feif- origin a ted, and hath its original from fome- thing cife. Catife and eKTedt,' though,i*tcrfns of oppofite fignification/ are the fame thing—'' Vo- lition is ihe efFedl bf volition, and the caufe of volition— ch(6ice is fubje(5l to choice, command- ed by, and the prbcfucc of, an antecedent adt of choice.* Motive ' is th« previous ground and rea/o?i of the adls of the wili^ — ^^Yea, the neccfTary ground and reafon of their exertion ; without which they will not be iexerred, and cannot, ia the nature of things, take place : And they do excite thefe a'As of the tv'iH, and do iIms by s prevailing ihf^tiehce 5 yea, an infiuence which prevails to the produdVion of the a6l of the will, and for the difpofing of the mind to it. NoW if mocives difpofc the mind to adlion, then thty caufe the mind to be difpofed ; and to caufc the ifnind t© be difpofed, is to eaufe it to be willing ; ^hd to caufe it to be vviHing, is to caufe it to will ', and that is the fame thing as to be the eaufe of an aft of t^e will. And yet it is hardly proper to fuppofe motive to be a eaufe of an ad of the v^^ill ; or that a principle of will is moved, or caufed to be cx'erted by it -, or that ft has any catifality in the prbdudtion 6f it :' And that for this very good i^eafon^ that thcjr :5rc not distinct. *
W^ * hbpcr' ^c * need n^ iibdw jit ill' to fhew the abfurdity' of this fche'mh * and whac ah v/hole heap of rhCohfi'ftHicieJ we haVe htrr. The matter is -already lb. pT^iify, Ws t^ render any; fcafoning upon it impertinent/
Mr;
iy th JiroH^eJl Motive: «"?
"Mr. Edwards aflerts, as well as Mr. Chuh^^ *that volition is not governed by fuperior ftrcngtli of the motive that is followed, beyond motives to the contrary, previous to volition itfelf.' p. 12^) It appears, on Mc, Edwards's ' fuppofuion, that volition mud be without any previous ground in any motive •, thus : If it be, as he fuppofeth, that the will is not determined' by the gr^atcO: .apparent good' — that this is nothing ' didind* from volition 5 then volition cannot be owiiig to any previous ground, or caufality, or f^iperior flrcngth of the motive that is followed, any more than on the fuppofition <5f the wiU's d^- tcrmining itfelf, : there being no diftin^ion be- tween the higheft motive, and the adl of voli- tion. To fay, therefore, that the former de- termines the latter, is to fay, that the will is felf-dctermined. Yet Mr. Edwardi fays, ' There is fuch a thing as a diverfity of flrength in mo- tives to choice previous to the choice iiftlf.' (p»' 125) He has not (hewn us wherein this diver- fity lies \ or how motives have a ftrength pre* xlous to choice, and yet are not dijiind from it. Would he fay, that motives have a fuperior ilrength ^rm</^^j to their ftarjing in the mind^s view ? or is their appearing flrongeft to the mmd antecedent to the choice -, or co-temporary v;ith it. The latter doubtlefs : For th;s ap-; pearance is not dillin'fl from the mind's choice.' tiad Mr. I^divards proved, (as be aflerts) that there is a *preponderancy of the inclination previa ous to the acl of choice/ (p. 260) it might have cleared the matter. Bot '• certainly, there is ;no need of multiplying words. We prefume there is nothing more unintelligible, and void ofdif- iiaGt^ coaiiftenc meaning, ia. all the v/ntings cf
±1 Th will mi necejfarlly determined
UDuns Scotus^ and Thomas Aquinas.'* * (p. 122) That we have not taken advantage of a paffage madvcrtent'y wrote by Mr. Edwards^ the reader may lee by taming to it. (p. 11, 12) He is there txbrhUin^ his pian^ and intimates his care to exprels himielf with precijjon, and fo as i3ot to be milaf^prehcnded. It is at his en- trance on his work. Says he, ' 1 have rather chojen to expr^fs myfelf (hus^ that t.he will always is as the greacell app,^rent good, than to lay, ihc will is ditermined by the greateftapparenr good'.; and proceeds to afiign a r^fl/^« for his ihus je^pref- iilnghimfelf: ^Becaufean appearing moft agreable' to them nd, and the mind*s chufing, leem nardiy to be properly and perfediy dijiin^. If firi5i fropriety iif Jpeecb be infifted on, it may more properly be faid, that the voluntary action^ which is the fruit and xonj^quen^e of the rpind's choice, is determined by that which appears moft agrea- ble, than the preference ov_<:\\o\ct it felf* Who will fay Mr. Edwards hath not here *.expre fled himfclf with ftridt proj.ricty,' and given a good reafcn for ' exprefTing himlelf thus ?'
* Feom things that, have. been' rcrparked, vye
think
♦ < It is indeed impoffible to offer' Mr. Edwards's < ar- gument without overthrowing it •, the thing fuppofed in it being incopfiftcnt with itfelf, and thct which denies itfelf (p. 82} Motive goes b^fcrey and is the ^r^'tf'z/^,?,'' of volition, \K\\\Q.h follows i\ but is liOtdiSiin^f from it. By hif argument,. ' the /ry? fin ful volition was detfti mined by aforegoing (infu) vo'ition j the £rft fm'u! a<El of choice was before the firft finful a<ft of cloice ^arc' chofen and determined bv it.* (p 377.8J For the hip^heft ni«tivc is the fame as vo'ition, and th'- fiiftfm^u] volition (prang from th.c hij^ncfl mctive : M., Edvjards alio fpcaks of chufmg ^s a man pleajdh'^u c. as he du/a/j*
fy the Jlronge/I Motive: s^
ihlnk it clearly follows, th^z Mr. Edwards hath equally failed in pointing out the more immedi- -att caufe of volition, as its original czui^. By his own declaration, the will is not determined hyy but the fame thing with, the ftrongeft mO' tive. H« hath only {hewn wriat determines ex^ iernal action or condu5f — a point very different from the « ecemiination of the will. And hence (according to IMr. Edwards^ own reafoning) the enquiry, ' What deteimines the will ?' is pre- cifely the fame with this, * What caujeth an ob- je^ to appear moft agreable ?* A very different enquiry, furely, irom this. Whether volition is ^^, or according to, the agreable .appearance of an objedl ? unlefs we will confound caufe and effcd. The agreable appearance, faith Mr. hdwardsy is the mind'^ preference, choice, or determination. :Buc antecedent to the mind*s view of the object, there muft be romething in it fthe objt^] to caufe it to appear agreable whea viewed-r-fonieihing independent on, and prior to the view— or the mind muft be in fuch a particular (late, frame, or temper — or view the object under fuch and fuch ci re urn fiances, in ordtr ^o it^s appearing thus and thus agreable. Now when It can be diilindly ihewn, what that is in any objedl it/elf, or iii the ftate, manner, and circumllances of the mind viewing it, which caafcth (produceth) the agreable appearance ; then, perhaps, the determining caufe of volition may be dilcovcred. That which caufeth the agreable appearance, produceth the highell mo- tive, that is, volition. Upon Mr. Edwards's own {late of the queflion, there is no making any fenfe of his words, to fay, that the higheft motive is the caufe, or determiner of volition; — " -"- ^ This
t4 ^^^ ^^^^' ^^^ fiecejjarily diiermmd
This he hath, in exprefsA&rms demcd. And y«t great part of his book was wrote to prove it. It is the * pofition of chief . importance ii\ his difcourfe/
It will pdlTibly be faid, * There is no need of fuppofing the ftrongtft niotive. to be prior to, or 4ijiin5l ixom^ volition •, but that the latter is de- termined by the former in the very a6t of voli- tion'. To this it is fvifficienf to anfwer in Mr. JE^ze^arJi's own wojds, * that the will is not de* Urmined hy the greateft apparent good, but the a6kion, v/hich is the/ra// ot vohtion. Is deter- mined hereby'. Thc^ugh we Riay infift on this as a full reply to the objedtion ; yet we may . alfo add, with much propriety, Mr. Edwards's remarks * on the fcheme of his opponents, with the fmall aUeration,which the reader will obferve by the words not included under inverted cam- mas.
First, * |f the determining aft' (the highefl:
. motive) ' be before the determined in order of na-
ture, being the caufe, ground, or reafon of its
pxiftence, this as much proves it to be dill\n^
from it, 2^vy(Mndeptndent on it^ as if it were in or-
i der of titm\
SECONDLY, *If the determining ad'(the (Ircn-
■geft motive /is not before the determined, inorder
, c^ ^me or nature, nor dlflind from ic — 1 would
.. 99 this obfcrvc, that the thing in queftion Teems
to be forgotten, or kept our of fighf, /;; a dark-
■ nefs^ and.unintelligiblenejs of fpeech. The quellion
ih
?y We Jtrongeft Mott^l ^l
IS, Wliat influenccth, dircds, oi- dctfrmincs the rnind or will to come to fuch i choice as it does I or what is the caufc, ground, or rrafon, whyit coticludcs thus, and not othcrwife ? Now it muft be anfwercd, according to, Mr. Edwards's 'no- tion, that the will influences, orders, and deter- mines itfelf. For the will is determined by the ilfongcfl; motive, and this is nothing dijlinrt from volition. Now that the ftrongeft motive * cau- feth, influenceth, and determineth the will, and yet is not antecedent to it •,' nor diftind from it, *is a eontradidion,' To fay that one' thing is the caufe or reafon of another, is to fay, tliac the former is prior to the latter. The caufe is diilind from the efFe(51:, and prior to it. To fay, that the ftrongeft motive, 'orders, influences, determines the ad of volition,' and yet is not
* properly diftind, is to make the exertion both caufe and efFedl. The queftion is. What is the caufe and reafon of the lours exerting fuch an ad ? -To which the anfwer is, the foul exerts fuch an adj and that is the caufe of it. And fo, by this^ the exertion muft be prior to, and dif- tind from itfelf.*
ThiR&ly, *If the meaning be, that volition has no caufe, and rs no efled:, bat comes into exiftehce of itfelf^ without any ground or reafon'; Mr. Edwards then, 'dorh nothing but confound himfelf and others with words without a mean- ing. * There is a great noifc made about 'mo- tive's
* Mr. Edwards had a common right with others to ex- prefs his thoughts in his own way. But we fhould Ka^e been gla^, if he had fixed a prccife meanirg to ^is oWa tenant And tliou.gh he hath fpcnt a large
number
t4 Tie, will net necej/arily ieterfnined
tive's fovereigDty and energy', as the fource of- all ads of the will j biu when the matter comes to be explained,: the meaning is, that thefe adts arile from nothing, no caufe, no power, no in- fluence, being at all concerned in the matter.'
And
number of pages ( from p. i,— '4}.) in explaining terms, yet nis definitions are fo lengthy and lax, his ufe of fome words fo different from what is common, yea,(o differently does he himfeif ufe the fame terms, that the reader is almoft unavoidably confounded in a jumble of indeterminate words and phrafes. Wc fliall give a few inftances. l^he term tiUl is forae- times ufed for an ahjirall power, property, or faculty ; (p. 38, 39.) bomctimes it is confounded with mo- tive-t (p. II, 12.) while at other times, and indeed more generally, it is ufed to denote the agent — As where the will is faid to be the fuhjfH of commands^ gee — where the a£is of the will are fpokcri of— wh-rc motives are reprcfented as infiuencing and dtter- viining it, i. e. the agent. ( For motives do not in- fluence mecr properties.)
By motive ( the higheft ) he explains himfelf to mean the fame as volition -y fp. li. n.) while he alfo undcrftands by it fomething extrinfic ftanding in the mind's view, and having a tendency y by the ap- pearance it makes, to excite and engage the mind to fuch and fuch volitions — i. e. to incline and difpofe it to fuch and fuch a choice. Again, he means by motives, inclifiaiicn or difpofuion^ and exprefly blends •moral motives and inducements* with*W;/; and difpofnnni of the heart,* making them the fame. ( p. 319, 31.) That is, motives are fomething without themfclvfs, and have a tendency to excite and engage 10 thtmfelves, and arc uot diJiinSi from thcmfelvc$» (p. 8,9, II.)
In like manner, while he is taking pains to make out a diftin^ign betwcea naturel and mgrd neceffity^ \a
C9af»uncla
hy thg flrongeft M9ttvel tf
And yet it is maintained, that * all a£^s of voli- tion have a prior ground and rcafon of their par- ticular exiftence ; a caufe ; which antece- dently determines them to be, and to be jufl: as they are. Now how can thcfe things hang together ?'
Wr. Edwards criticifeth Dr. Clark for ad- m'tting ' the neceflary connedion of volition With the lad diftate of the underftanding •,' and yet 'fuppofing the latter not to be diverfe from the adt of the will itfelf/ He hath this re- mark on the Dodor, * If the d date of the un- derilanding be the v try fame with the determi- nation of the will or choice, then this determi- nation is no fruit or effcd of choice.' And on- wards : If thefe ' be the fame^ then liberty con- fifts in the mind's having power to have whac diktat s of the underftandmg it pleafes, having opportunity to chufe its own didates of under-
F {landing/.
confounds them — (at leaft in our apprchenfion. Part I. Sea. 4.)
The term caufe^ as it hath bsen generally ufed, denotes ^ efficiency^ and has relation to an eiFcd produced — And Mr. Edwards himfelffays (after Spinoza and Hohbs) * that if it be not fufficient to produce the cfFed, or doth not always necejfarily produce it, there is no (uch relation fubfifting as wc fignify by the terms caufe and effed. That which fcems to be the caufV , can be no caufe.* Yet he tells us, 'that he fometimcs ufcs the word caufe to fignify any antecedent^ which is perhaps rather an occafton than a caufe of an event or thing ; and the word effeSf^ for the conjequence of another thmg*. (p 58, 59, 103) But whoever fup- pofcd the mccr oicafiQn oi a thing or evcHt to be the
fnufi
2^ 7hs will not necejfarily dettrmlmd'
ftanding.' "^ Might not cne in Dr. ClarBs behalf Uius reply ? ' Mr. Edwards fuppofcth that volition hath a necefTaiy conne^lion with the high- eft motive — and that the later is not properly dif- tindfiom theadof rhe will. If the higheii motive be the very y^;?/^ with the determination of the will or choice, then this determination is x\o fruit or effe.l^ of motive. Moreover, Mr. Edwards hath • csprell'<;d himfclf thus, it is not proper to fayv ^ that the acfl: of volition itfelf is determined by •the higheft motive.' If thefe be the fame, then liberty confifts in a man's having power to' have what motives he pleafcs, having opportunity to
chuls
£aufe thereof, in fach a fenfe as trjat the thing or e- vent is necejjurih dependent on, connected with, and proceeds from the occ2fiQnofit ? Our Lord's co- ming was the antecedent and occsfion of difcord and war. Did thefe neceffarily proceed from his coming I Was there no more in the confequent than in the antecedent ? Had Mr. Edwards ufed the terms occa- fion and confequence, inftcad of caufe and eftlct, in thofe parts of his book, where (by his own acicnow- ledgement) the former would have been more pro- per, he m.ight have been better underftood, and would have taken a iikdicr method to ' cut offoccafion from cavillers and objectors.* (p. 59, 393, .q^, mar- gin.)
The reader will a?fo take notice of the promlfcuous ufc of the words caufe^ ground^ rtafon. So far ai^ an zdd- on is conformable to right reafon, fo much reafm there is for it, and no more. Every inftance of the divine condua hath 2i Jufficicnt vcs^ion : It is not fo with the condua of the creature. As much y^;z as there is in the world, fo much adioa there is without reafon,
t P. ix4> 1x5.
l>y the firGngeft Motive^. f'lf
chufe his own motives. But this is abfurd : For it fuppofcth the choice is already maJe, be- fore the motive has its efFe6t •, and that the vo- lition is already ex6t ted : That is, choice is prior to choice. Mr, Ed^wards recurs to the old ab- furdicy of one decerrn-nation before another, and the caufe of it ; and another before that, deter- mining that ; and fo on in infinitum.^ Thus mighc his cricicifm on Dr. Clark be replied to.
Upon the whole : The queftion, What deter- •miaes the will ? is ' unanfwered, and yet re- turns' For aught that appears from Mr. £i- wards^s difcourfe, the will is not properly deter- mined ac all. 'Inftead of folving the difficult ty^ or anfwering the queftion wuh regard to volition, namely, How it comes to exift ? (as he propofcch ic) he forgets himfeif, and anfwers another queftion quite diver fe, and wholly' re- mate, nan?*ely, What determines ;;?^/m^/a6Hon ? The queftion is, How volition itfelf comes to exiit ? By v/Iiar caufe it is produced ? ' Why the foal exerts fuch an aft, and not another ? Or why it adis with fuch a particular determina- tion ? Why its action is thus and thus limited, directed, determined ?' If it be laid, its a£ts pro- ceed from the ftrongeft motive, this is faying, they are fulf-determined -, (the ftrongeft motive and volition not being diftiniij which is, upon the whole, faying, they exift without a caufc.
Therefore the fuppofed ftrengfh of motive ■■* affords no relief from the difficulties, which' •Mr. Eiwards's ' notion of 2 /elf-determimng pow- cerin the will is auendcd wiih .^ nor will it help,
.ia
'30 ^he will not nscejfarily determined^ Sec.
in the leafl, its abfurdities and inconfiden- cies.' * Whether corporeal adion be always determined by the will, or the greateft appa- rent goodj we Ihall briefly enquire in tjie next fcdion.
♦ P. 67, 63, 71,
:SECT.
S E C T. III.
External JSflon or Cofidu5f not dfter mined by the JVtli^ upon Mr, Edwards'j Scheme,
ALL moral good or evil confifting in ihc diffoftiion ov Jlate of the mind or will^ ic is of iraall moment, comparatively, what deter- mines material adion. Suppofe this is indeed determined by the will, the enquiry of chief importance is, What determines the will irfelf. The queftion. What determineth the motions and adions of the body ? is (\u\iq foreign to the fubjed. But as Mr. Edwards affirms that the Willis the true caufe uf external action or con- dud, and makes the whole of liberty to lie here, we will examine this pqfition, on his own prin- ciples.
*The voluntary adion, which Is the fruit and confequence of volition, is determined by that which appears moil agreable -,' or by the Will which ' always is as the greateft apparent good,' and ' not properly diftindt' from it. ' Li- berty is a power, opportunity any one has of doing, or conducing according to his will, be- ing tree from external hindrance or compul- fion. — Or a power of executing his will. There are two things that are contrary to liberty. One is conliraint ; the fame is otherwife coWtd force and coa^ion ; which is a pcrfon's being nccefTi- tated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is refiraint. ; which is his being hindered, ^nd ijoc having power to do according to his
will^
'|i External Anion net determined ly tie
will"* In the determination of the will /V feif^ he fuppofeth a man cancioc be fice. * To talk of liberty, or the contrary, as btlonging lo the very will i'fJf^ is not to Ipeak good {tn\c.'\ He Genfures Dr Whitby as faying, ' Ibat a man cxercifeth liberiy, not only in txier?ial adtions, but in the adls of the will thdmjelves' J Tp. y6^ 77) He luppofech there is a caufe, ^rz^r to the vwiirs own ads, detern:i!ning volirion. ' Let the perfon come by his voliiion how he will, if there is nothing in the way to hinder his ptrfuing and executing it, he is fully and pcrfedly Iree'. Up- on tne whole, liberty coafills nor in a power of
willing
•^ Parti. St-a. 5. t Part II. Sea. i. J P 76^ 77.
J Qucere, When St. Fdul faith, ^To will h prefent with ine ; but how fo perform that which is gc^od I find net*, is he to be undeifl' od as fpeakir.g oi external zt .internal impediment ? if of the iarter,th;rn th^re are other thin-s oppofcd to liberty befidc outward con- ftraini. or rtitfaint. If o/ the former, this wholly frees from moral blame. When he alfo fpeaks of a man's * having powc:r oyer his own will'? (in a par- ticular inftance alluded to) doth he mean power o\'"er the external acfts ? U this be the meaning, cou-d a man have power here withouc fi R purpoftng in his heart to refiain in the thing ipokm of. And if in this purpofe he hath not pow.^r over hiinfcU ( i. c. if it be not his own purpoft) how could he be faid to have power ever the outward a6t I
Again, the fame apoftle obfervrs, 'The fpirit lufteth againft the fl^'fh, and the fl^fn agair.ft the fpirit, fo th'it ye cannot do the thing: which ye would,* Is this to be unde-ftood q{ external in.pedimeni ? If the Maw in the m -mbers v/arring .i£>;ain{l the 'aw of the mind/ 2n external 'uw ? * The ;>ood that I would, I do not : But the evil which I \%ould not, that I do/ Is this -meaflt of an e^^uniul wilt I
Willy Upon 7kfr Edward^'j SchemQ 3,3,
willing, hwl \i^ an opportunity oi dcliig wh^it Is already willed — of ex^cut'ng a choice already made, not in a power oi' tbu/mg. it is nor ac all applicable to the ?;//«{*. 1 he /f<^/^ of the will is fixed by nectiTicy — and irora hence pro- ceed external adions.
Now how is it pofTible that a6lion and con- dudl fhould be free and yet be the efftfts of a necefTary caufe ? * There is not more in the ef- fedl than in the caufe. Thofe things which areindifTolubly connected with other things that are necefTary, are themfelves necefTary/ How is corporeal aflion determined by the will, when ' the will in no inflance is ics own determin- er', conl'cquently net in the particular detfrmi- naiion to move the body ? At lead, the will de- termines this no otherwife than as it is itfelf de- termined hereto by an antecedent, neceilary caufe. Or how can that be called a voluntary determination, which is the effect of neccfTity ? or that a voluntary adion to which a man is ne- cefKirily determined ? If the ad of the will, which is fuppofed to determine and fix the exter- nal ads of the body, be not itfelf free, accord-^ ing to Mr. Edwards's own reafoning, the adi- ons proceeding herefrom cannot be io. ^ ' An ad of the will is an ad of choice'. Now if there
be
* Kad Mr. Edwards attended to his own rcsfoning:, he would not have afHrmed, that external adions might be Utc^ when thew 11, which determines them, is fubjed to necefTity. For, fays he, *- \i \h^ deter^ mining ad be neccflary, the man cannot be the fub- jcd of command or government in his external anions; l)ecaufe thefe are all necefTary, being the ne«ceil'iry cffeds of the ads of the wilfthemfclves*. (P» ^124, ai5, 256, alio p. 46, 47, 48.)
34 External Action not determined hy tie
be no liberty exercifed in;chu^lng,prefcr^ing,whe^- inisllbcIxye;ie^ci^eGat all ? What ib€hoice didindt from liberty ? Yet we 'are tcid, that liberty is cxf rciitd only in the execution of choice. That "we nave not a power of election or liberty in the ad of volition, at lead not in the firtt and leading ad of choice, which determines all the reft.
If, therefore, freedom be net in the will, we fhould be glad to know where it is ? Whether any being can be faid to do, or condutl according to his pleajure or choice. Choice and pleafure (Jo called) is fixed by a pievioos ncceiTary caufe — and doing or conduding fixed by volition — Now the immediate f roit and coniequences of volition muil be of the fame nature with their caufe — alike nccefTary. In other words, the will is no caufe at all. For a neceiTaiy caufe is not pro- perly f[:eaking a caufe ; it is nothing diftinct from a' meer infirun^ier>r. A caufe, ftriclly fo called, mult bt free -, at lead fo far as praife or blame, reward or punidimenr, belong to it.
Upon the whole, external actions mud ulri- marely be determined, not by the will, but by that caufe which determlneth the will, agreable to our author's own principles. The will being in no indance it's own determiner, there is in no indance a power or capacity of choice in man- kind. For choice is the fame as the will's deter- mination : A power or capacity of choice, there- fore, would be a power of felf-determination, which Mr. Edwardi's whole fchemc is dcfigned to fnew the abfurdity of.
The fum of Mr. Edwards^ fchemc appears to be this. Liberty confids in ^ man's power to
cs scute
WilU upon Mr Edwards'^ Scheme, 35
execute \\\% will — ^o d(r cr <ri>^^«^ according to what is willed. His will is (not dtttrmined by^ but is) the greateft apparent good. And yet every volition is the necefiaiy effc5l of the greateft apparent good, produced and determined by it as the efficient CdxS^ — which caufe, however, is nothing diftmct from the efFefl produced. From what particular caufe any objedl comes to have the greateft appearance of good is yet a fe- cret, of no ufe to be known to nine hundred and ninety nine out a thoufand of mankind. Forthe fatisfadion of the thoufand th pcrfon, Mr. 'Edwards has laboured to explore this fecret -, and yet his * having failed here doth no: overthrow the po- fition, which was the thing of chief importance in
his difcourfe ;* for it only remains to be— -1
explained and proved. Antecedent necefilty de- termines the will •, this determines corporeal alli- ens ; and aiflion is voluntary -, i. e. is Willed, or caufed to be willed — there is no outward compul- fion or reftraint in the cafe, but only a neceffary in^ ward determination. Liberty is indeed necefTary to praife or blame. But the a£ts of the body be- ing free from outward coaftion or impediment, there is no need of liberty in ihe mind^ as a foun- dation of moral government.
These, as near as we can come at them, are Mr,Edward>^s fenciments : The mention of which, fufficiently expofeth the abfurdityof the fcheme — it's repugnancy to itfelf ; to common fenfe, toall morality and religion ; and confequently the per- plexity and folly of applying metaphyfical reafb- ning to a fubjedl, which can be obfcured only by the fubtilty of argument.
g PART
I? Frinctpks conf.dered as data
PART II.
^jf ex^fBinalion of Air, Edwards'; do^irinerefpe^- ing the indijjoluhle conm5iion of moral caufts and effe^s.
w
ERE we remarking on the writings of an avowed Fatalist, a fomewhat diffe- rent method might be expected from what we Ihali purfue. But our controvcrfy being with un eminent christian divine, feveral things may be taken for granted, which, in arguing with a fatalift, would need proof. According- ly we dtfire thefe few obvious principles of «^- i'liral religion not lefs than chriftianity^ may be eonfidered as dala in the prcfent argument.
First, That there is an intelligent, dffigning author of nature ; or original eaufe of all beings and things ; who (by the terms) is uncaujcd — ex- iting prior to, and exclufive of, all defign con- tributing, to his CAiilence. ^ Whence \i follows.
Secondly^
f Mr. Edwards has intFrnated, incTeecT, ' that there Is in the nature of things a foundation for the know- ledge of the being of a GOD, without any evi- dence of it from his tvorks' — but adds, ' We have not flrength of mind to comprehend ' his exiftence* in thiS'-i/idef^endint manner'. The way that mankind come to the knowledge of his being is that which, the apoftle fpeaks of, i^<7.v;. i. 20. Wc hr A a fund and prove a po/lerioriy or fiom effi£is^ that there maft fee an eternal caule. And then, fecondly, prove by argumentation, not intuition, that this being muft be nectfTarily exiflent. And then, thirdly, front the proved neceffity of his exigence, we may defend^ aiid p«gve many gf his pcrfe^ions ap-'ion' (P. 60,6 i.^
in the prefent argu-men^^ 3.7
Secondly, That all things are originally
'wbd* tlM creator mad', them ^and intended they [kouid.
he. Whether animate or inanimate, rational or
irrational, throyghout all worlds — they have all
fuch powers ana properties, fuch relations, con-
nedlions
•But is it 2.xi\\\K\<i a frior'i to srgue from fffc5li ? ' If ftri(3: propriety of fpecch be infiftsd on,' doth not this pe- culiar kind of argument fuppofe, that the being of a GOD may be proved ' without any evidence of it from his worki V If fo, there fecms to be fome jumble ^n dif ending to this argument 'from the proved neceffi- ty Of GOD's exiftence*. We cannot but take no- tice, that in what we have here extra(5led, the terms are changed in the latter part of the paragraph from what they were in the beginning of it. it is firft gi- ven as the author's opinion, that there is a foundati- on in nature for our coming to the knowledge of the BEING of a GOD, without any evidence of it from hi: works. But at the clofe of the paragraph it is obfcr- ved, that ' from the proved necellity of his exijlence.^ we may prove many of his perfections a priori.* in the Lmz place Mr, Edwards obferves, 'we argue his beings from our own being, and the being of other things' — which is the only medium to prove the being of a GOD fp. 386 ) What 'foundation is there then, in the nature of things, for the knowledge of the BEING of a GOD, without any evidence of i£ from his works' ? What medium of proof I
j3r. SAMUEL CLARK, in h:s ' demonflration of the be- ing and attributes of GOD,' undertakes to prove, that he ' exifts by a necelTity abfolute in the nature of the thing, itfeif^ — ' a neceflity antecedent, (in the order of nature, and of our ideas, though not ot time) to the fuppofition of his exiftence* — which neceffity he affigns as ' the natural ground^ foundation^ caufe^ or reafon of GOD's being.'
J^Jov/ thouih we wou'd not chafe to difUnt from fuch .» maftvr of leaion, yet the enquiry in a manner for-
cetk
3§ Principles conjtdend as data
nefllons and deftinatlcn, as the great former of tiicm has given and iniended. Caufes and efFcds can be trac.-d .no higher. We mull liop at iHe author of nature, the firft and original caufe.
Thirdly, BeHdes abfolute or natural perfe6l- ions (as ciemity, ielf exiftence, independance, infinity, ^c.) the Bril caufe is a being of a par- ticular r».i?r^/ charadter— is immutably jud, holy good, true, &c. Fourthly,
ceth itfflf upon us, Where is the propriety of fup- pofing any thing, in any fcnfe, to be the PRIOR, ground of the txillepce of the fiift caufe I "Doth not this convey the idea o{ an effect produced P ''I he Dr, rtrnssks on Sphczas d( €ti'u\c of neccflity, (or 'the neceffary foliowine; of an cir.ci from it's caufe') that * this riecclTity rnuft ftill b;: determined by fcmethins; anteo dent ^ and fo en inft-utely.^ Might not a Spinczift reply, that that nccefiity, which Dr. Clark faith is the cauie oi the exiftence of GOD mufl be determined by fomething antecedent ? and fo on' ?
The Dr. takes his rife to the neceUity of the divine exiftence from hence, Thst Hhtre hath exifted from eternity Tome one independent being, the author of
all other beings.' ( via. p. 8, 15. Edit. iOth.)
On this po/iuiatum he proceeds. Hence, and from things faid in his icv nth letter, it is probable he re- ally meant not to prove the ce-' lam cxijhnce of GOD a priori^ but his part'cu'ar perfel'ioni. ' The irfiai- ty, eternity, unity of GOD, cic mull be dcmonftra- ted from the nature cf neceil-iry exiftence; from the nature and confequences of that nectflity, by which the fi ^ caufe cxifts.' And yet, fpt aLing of the *fch-x) aftic way of proving the existence of the felf- cxillent being, from the abfolute perfection of his na- ture,' the Dr» remarks, ' All or any perfedlons pre- fupp'^'je ex'iience ; which hpetitio prificipi't. But bare neccility of exiftence doth not prefuppoff^ hwt infer ^ exiftence. In this cafe, here muft yiothing be pre/up- frjcd^ no nature whatjoevfrj' ^Letter 6th, p, 49c, 49 -' «>
In the prefent argument I gg?
Foup.THLV, That the moral perfcflions of GOD correfpond to the moral difcemment be hath given to us. For when wc fay, God is holy, juft, good &c, we fpeak altogether unmtellig^blyjif we fuppo(e thele perfedions in him to beeffenti-
ally
Why then did theDr. lay down his two nrfl: propofitions ( p. 8, 1 1, j as the media of proof ? if neceflity * doth TiOt pr£juppofe., but irfer exif^encc ; yet the method the Dr. takes to prove this necelTitv presupposes a na- ture and exiftence : It fuppoitth that tnere exijis an eternal, independent being — the author of ail other beings. The very thing tp be proved.
Admitting the Dr's poiition, that necrffity is the caufe of the divine exiitence ; to what purpofe is it wiih an atheift ? Ittalces for granted the thing in .q'jeftion. The ei-quiry is not. How GOD exifts ? but, H'hether he exifls ? Exillsnce, and the caufe of exiftence, are very diftindt. An enquiry about the latter plainly prefappofcth the former. So that while the Dr. endeavours to prove, that GOD exifts 'from a caufe within hinrifelf,' he takes for granted, that there is a GOD 'y and only accounts for a peculiar circumjfancey or this mode of his exiftence, that it is * by a necciHty of nature.' Whereas the fubjedt of enquiry between an atheift and a theift is not the niodui of exiftence, but the fimple truth or fa£i — is there in reality ' an eternal, independent being, the author of all other beings .'' Now from what can this point poflibiy be argued but from the phenomena of nature 1 if, from furveying vifible creation, the atheift is not convinced that GOD iS, how can we go a ftep farther with him ? Mufl he not think it imper- tinent, and petitio principii, if we undertake to Ihew
him 'HOW GOD exifts ? Or to aflign z ground
and reafon of an exiftence, which he believes nothing of ? But if from the frame of nature he is convinced of the certain exi/ience of GOD, he is no longer an atheift, and therefore needs not the argument a priori /or hi^ coavi<5tion.
Or
^o Principles confJered as data
ally different from the perceotions implanted m Isjs. . Not but the d^ity prffrffe h tnefc moral perfr^l ons in a dt^rte far above finite concep- tion i yef as m thele he propofeth his own ex- ample to our imication, io that which may be
known
Or fuppofe the ath?ift, for argument's fake, to a^mtt th.it GOD is, but ^cmands to have the caufe ox ground of hii exiilfnce adi/.n'd and explained. Is any theiil holden to (hew hm, how the divine beinsr ex'fted from eternity ? Can this be done f Hath Dr. Clark attempted it ? In one word, are the phaenomena of natu-e fufHcient to prove the being and perfect ons •of r]OD ? if th'v arc ; what need of any other ar. •gu !i':?iU than that a p?/ieriori} If they are not, it is certain the argument a priori can produce no con- viction ; For this refolves itfelf into the argument a po/ierjori.
That the being of a GOD is indeed neceffary, eve- ry thing round us o'eclares. If the things that are fren were cheated and made y the fclf-exiftence and Cternitv of the creator is proved beyond d.>ubt For whatever hath a beginning exifts from fomc caufc without itfelf. Now as this can nor ipe faid of the creator o( all things and beings, it follows, tnat.h» muft h^Jelf-exiflent and iter nal.
The Dr. tells us, that ' the eiernliy of GOD' (eltheir M parte cnts^ or a parte pofi) 'can no otherwife be p;o- vcd than by the argument a priori.'* But, .admitting an author of naiure^ doth ic not foUow, that he cx- ifttd, not mecriy from tie bej;inn=nor of the phreno- mena of nature, but from evsrlajlmgl aa-i bemg in- dependent, mail alwa s continue to fXiit.? Do not thefe things fol.ow, without cofiii.ierine the ' intrin- iic nature o^ neiejjary txijUnce" \ (which is allowed to be inexplicabU ) Do not they follow from this .fimple conficieration, that the ori;^inal caufe exiils from no external cauf- ? St t^aul fuppofeth fic Mfrnity of GOD is no lets evident from .the th;i?gs
in the 'prefent a^gumeni, 41
known of God in this regud is manifcfl: from the moral faculy in man, whtrcrby he is a iaw to himfelf (Not meaning 10 exclude the help and imfrovement derncd from reveUiticn)
Fifthly, That the moial (haradter (.fGod is ih2ii foundation of religion^ as the moiai liactrd of Rian IS o[ his accountablenefs
Onj the tooting c^f ihelc principles, we fhall proceed to examine Mr. tdwards\ dodlrinc of neceffity.
Sect.'
that are made, than his exiftence, power, and god- head. J he inviJlbU things of him j horn the creation of the u-orld-^ are CLEav^LY Jeen^ bting under Jhod by the the things that are ma<le^ EVEN his eternal power AND GODHEAD ; fo th&t they arc without excufey who will not admit this proof.
The Dr. obferves upon th« whole, that « the proof a priori is capable of being underftood only by a few attentive tninds ; btcaufe it is of ufe only aoau.ft learned and metaphyfical difficulties' — while the proof apojleriori is level to ailnicns capacities' — that this, therefore, 'is by far the mo/? generally ufeful argu- ment, and what GOD cxpeds moral agents ihould be determined by* But if the eternity 2nd immorta ity of GODcanaot be proved a po/ieriori, how is this argument fufficient with commoh people ? Do not they reed an argument to prove that GOD is eternal and immortal as well as philofophers f Are the generali- ty incapable of receiving any proof o; this point f Or is it the privilege of the learned, that ' GOD, as moral governor,' does not ' expedt they {hould be de- termined by' that evidence, whereby ' mora/ agents fliould be determined' ?
What the Dr. favs concerning the unity and irfinitf of GOD, that they are provciible only a priori^ we thinic liable to much the lame exceptions. Mcta- phvfical reafoning on tnis rubje6t, as well as fcmi *ri>^r points of theology, infiead of relieving any phi- lolophic difficulty, hath, on the contrary, ^w^Vi great advantage to iiii(idelity.
SECT. I.
Whether the *will le necejfarily determined ly an extrinfic caufe ?
MR. Edwards ^o\Ad hzv^ his readers 'oh- ferve, that when he fpeaks of connexion of caufes and efe£is^ he hath refped to moral eaufes, as well as thofe char are caHcd natural m diftindion from them — that the ads oi the will mzyh^ ^scer I airJy and iuoijlc'hii^iy count ded with the moral cauie, as natural effcds with their natural caufes — ^thac the connedion is as fure and perfect between moral caufes and efitds, as natural 5 that moral necefTuy may be as abjolute as natural jFiecefTity.' * Yea, he advertifeth us, that ' where he ukth this diilinction of moral and natural ne- ceffity, he would not be undcrfiood to fuppoie, that if any thing comes to pafs by the form.er kind of nectlfsty, the nature of things is net con- cerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do noc mean to determine, that when a moral motive is fo flrong, that the ad of the will infallibly fol- lows, this is not owing to the nature of things. I fuppofe that neceffity, which is called natural, in diftindioa from moral, is fo called becaufc ineer nature is concerned, without any thing of choice \ not becaufe nature has never any hand in our choice : For choice arifcs from nature as truly as other events.' So that, upon the whole, much the fame rules are fuppofcd to take place in. the moral world, in GOD's government of
moral
*Part i» Sed. 4. p. 30,31, 3«. ^
hy an extrlnfic catife ? 4j
moral agents {fo called) as in ihe adjuftment anc difpolal of natural things. What Mr. Eduards intended by a moral eaufc, we cannot fatisfy our- felves. Sometimes he appears to reafon as if h- fuppofed there was really no dijtin^ion between ^ moral and natural caufc, (^i, 32.) or none to be perceived j while more generally he feems to fuppole a dflindion of great importance •, which, however, he hath not fo clearly pointed out as were to be wifhed.
Indeed, if there be not a real and important; diftindion between moral caufes and natural, ic plainly follows, that Mr. Edwards hath takea pains to no purpofe to fhew, that natural neceffi- ty wholly precludes from praile or blame, while moral necefTicy doth not at all. And if there be a real and important diPdn^lion, it is of impor- tance that it be clearly feen.
In the fedion lad referred to, Mr. Edwards fuggefts, that 'when we fpeak of choice as dif- thi6t from nature, ic is without refieclion and rejearch ; names being given to things according to what is mod obvious. But though the de- pendance and connexion between adls of volition or choice, and their caufes, according to eftabli/h^ id laws^ is not fo fenfible and obvious, as thac eftabhfhed law and order which is feen in the ma- terial world ; and though men make a diftindli- on between nature and choice as if they were compleatly and univerfally diftindt 5 yet choice arifes from nature as truly as other events How- ever, thefe are the names that thefe two kinds of neceffity have ufually been called by •, (viz. natu- ral and moral) and they mud be diilinguilhed by fome names or other 5 for there is a diltindion H or
^4 Whether tine tvu) hentcejfarlly dster?)iintd'
or difference between them, that is very impor- tant in it's cofjfequenccs : Which difference does not liefo much in the nature oi ih^ conne^ion^ as in the two tefms connived.'' The difference is important^ but not fevjible and obvious . The eauk, with whkh the effed is connedted, is of a |>articijlar kind, viz of a moral nature — the effect affo is of a particular kind, being of a Hioral nature.' Bot are we not told ii^ this fame place, that the effect is alio conntded with the 7JaturaiQ2i^k^ and is owing toihie nature of things? I'here is the y^/«/ influence of moral and natu- ral necelfity in moral events — iHtir inHuence is cloiely linktd together. Now till the me^fure of influence to be afcrrbed to mral nectffity is dif- t.ndly apprehended, it is jmpofllbls ro tell when^ ar.d how ^r, a pcrfon is re ward able or punifha- ble-^nat-ural necc»%y (by fuppofuion; being in- confident wirh reward or punifhment. But let any one e;iam^ne Mr. Edwards's book, and fay, uheiher he hath fhewn when and how far the ads of ths will proceed from natural necefilty, and when, or how far fj'om moral. Whether the fo mueh labour'd dillindion, or difference between natural and moral caufes is not con- ' founded and exploded I
It is difScalt to determine whether Mr. Ed- ^vcards fuppofed the ads of the will to be the ne- cefiary e^^e6ts of an intrwftc caufc, or an e^.trinfic, Thcfe are ufed fo promifcuoufly and indetermi- nately through his book, volition beii.g fome- timcs afcribed to the one, fometimes to theoiherj^ 5hat, though they are cflentially different and op- pofiie, it is hard to fay which he moreefpecially intended by that moral neceflity, to which he c.ytry where fuppoleih the will is iubjcd. Either
iaternalj,
'£y Ofi extrinfic cau/e ? .45
iftternal, original bias, or fomething ext-rlofic, is
the caufe, to whofe efficiency, det^rminai-ion,
,<:o|nmand, decifion, the will is as much lubjcdt,
as the motion of the body to the will— this being
*as paftve and nectfiary wjth refpedt to ths an-
^epednt determining caufe of it,' as the motions
,of the hands and feet with refpea: to the detef-
,n)iiiation pf the wiH. ( »^3> ^^4 )
We rather think it was Mr. Edwards^ opinion, that the will is determmed by an exirin- fic caufe. But finccihis is by no means certain from his book— fince he hath not exprefffd hini- felf clearly, or we are incapable judges of this intricate fubje6t, we fliall lake liberty.^o examine his doftrin^ on both fuppDruions— either of an extrinfic, or intrinf.c caufe, The former fhall be the iubjedt of ttie prefent fc^ion.
Whether volition is neceffarily determined
by ^n extrinfic caufe ? Mr. Edwards afl^erts, that
th.e ads of ibe will are not neccffary in ibem/ehes^
or in their own «^m.^ •, but by their connexion
with fomc caufe that is ncctfTuy tn itfelf. In
bis OW.B words, they 'are neceffary by a neceffity
o^ conferiuence: The only way that any thing
that is to come to pafs hereafter, is, or can be, ne-
eJ^fTary, is by a connexion with fomething thaus
rweceflary in it's own nature, or fomething that
already is, or has be.^n ; To that the Pne being
foppofcd, the other certainly follows* 1 his alio
is the only way th.t all 'things paft, (excepting
thofe which were from eternity) could be ne-
e-ffa-y before they came to ff/s, or could come to
pals nccdlanly •, and therefore the only way m
wh ch any efYedl or event, or any thing whatloe-
ver that ever has had, or will have a beginning,
' " ' ha<i
4? Whether the will he necejfarily determined
has ccme into being necefifarily, or will hereafter riectfTirily exift. And therefore this is the ne- ccfiuy which efpecially belongs to controverfies about the ads of rhe will.' * From all which it follows, that the a61:s of the will are neceffary ONLY by their ccnnc^ion with the Jelf-eiciftent be^ ing. For he only exifted from eternity. His exiftencc only is nectfTdry in itfeif. He there- fore IS the necrlTary caufe of all volition — o^ Jin- Jul volitions equ^illy as holy ones. Either there- fore the afls of the will do not come to ^ pais necejfarily^ -f (as Mr. £^'«;^r^5 fuppofes) or GOD is i)[\€: author znd Jourcec^ i\\?it neceffny by vi^hich .they come to pais. Whether the latter is recon- cileable Vviih divine moral rrditude, ' let thofa -whp have hunnan underilanding in CAtrcife
The voluntary, defigning cau^e of the great "wickednefs creatures are guilty of, mod be either GOD or themfelves. The whole wickednefs muft be Charged to the one or the other. Now that creatures are not the voluntary defigning caufe of their own wickednefs f if we may caH it their £;w«) appears from hence, that wickednefs lies in the jlate of the v/ill, not in the cditns which pro- ceed from, or are iht fruhs Cf it. Mr. Edwards teacheth, that men muff be the authors of extet^ 77^/ adions, by bein^ the caules of them ^7 an a^ of will or choice, in order to praife or blame ; but that no fiuh thing holds with rejpe^f to (he a5fs
cf
• p. 25, I£)2, 103.
t Unlefs it be faidjthat they are neceflary by a connc^l-
' ion with this prop fition, ' two and two make
four * — -or thi?, ^ aii ires drawn from the centre
of a circle to the circuri^faencc are equal.' fp. 24-.)
ly an exttinfic caufe ^ ^J
cf tie w/7/ THEMSELVES, that they are the de^^ figning, voluntary caufe of them. ( 277. ) In the internal ad, (viz vohtion j the agent, or ra- ther fubje^^ is not ftlf-determined ; i. e. is not the caule of it, ' Freedom of will is not effcntial to the nature of winuQ and vice.' ( 256. )
*In external a.6\.ions men are felf-diretSled, felf- determined ; and their wills are the caufe of the iTiotions of their bodies, and the external things that are done ; fo that unlefs men do them vo- luntarily, and the adlion be determined by their antecedent volition, it is no adlion or doing of theirs;' ( 1H6. 287.) That is, rhey are the vo- luntary caufe, not of the evil vill in them, which is the ej/ence of vice, but only of the external adion, which is the meer i?ody and form of it. The cauTc of fin is without themfelves. In what conftitutes it's nature, they arc direded, deter- iTimed, by fome fuperipr agent, who is the caufe of every internal a6t of the will. For volition hath a caufe itfeif, as well as is the caule of cor- poreal adion Any one fees, that men's being the authors of corporeal a::tion meerly^ ' is no mo- ral evil, any more than ficknefs, or fome other natural calamity, which anfcs from a* natural * caule'.
Especially when it is farther confidered, in what lenfe men are the authors of corporeal adi- on, upon Mr. tdwardi's fcheme, will it appear, that they cannot, on this account, be changeable wifh moral evil. ' Every ad ot the will is ne- Cf (Tiry, becaufe dependent and confequent on a neceflary caufe.' ^ Therefore the adions of the
body
f " There is as much reafon to believe that all things ^re voluntary, as that all things are mcejary i and I
clcfije!
4^ Whether the w:Il he necejfartly deurmmed
body^are necefiary, being dependent and confo quent on the deterfnir.aiion of ih^ wil), which i^ dep^ndcpr and conicquent on a prior caulc — *in- difl()hibly conneded with what is necrfTiry in ic*s own nacurc ' Therefore men are not the aq- thors, the caufe, of corporeal adtion, in any pro- per ienfe at all ; as tfrey are not the authors of inward volition. For ' ic cannot be, that' they •ftould be the a6tive, voluntary, dercrtnining caufc oP their ^ own volitionsWor 'of the firff^ and leading volition, which deiermines ih^wMk offair: (2^4,225,70,71.)
To what extrinfic caufe then, or Xo wfaom, are the yplitipns of nief)..to be arcri|)e4, fince they
.are
defire ^ny one. to ihfw me^th^t the one is more clc^f and certain than the other. If he fays, that m:tives which determine or cauie the mind to e^xrrt wnat.I call voluntary jidi'ons, arc necejfary, and thertfoic the eff-<9:s or acfl^oiis following t^.e motives are alfo ne- cefiary ; this is juft as true a conicqu nee as that bs- caufe voluntary a<3:ions concur to' ihe pro^u£lon pf mcejfary effects, therefore th^fe ^^.di% Art voluntary. ^ for example, the w/r/w of mv prtfent writing is a perfuafion of the jaljhotid o^ Cai9\ fcheme ; and this ferfuafion I grant an.; fte is necejpiry. 1 can't help this jud^rrr.cnt ; but ftill, my writing, i ?Jfo fee, is no more mcejfary th^n the encreale of the motion cf niy hUnd^ or o' lYit hating of my pulfe vs voluntary ^ though the caufe concurring to it WiS rov voluntary drinbnj^ 4 certain quantitv of Ipints May i can with as much reafon argu^-.that 2^\ndturah^ 6i- are voluntary in their immediate caufes^ or p'-r.ceed f om their cbiice or wiU^ becaufe GOD their firft cau^'e is a voluntzry aod free c^^nt ^ z^ Cato c^n argue from the fond cautes or rnotives of human actions beina n^c.fliry, that the immediate caufe, the mind, is a nec:Jfary^ not a volun^ iary aticnt. But there is no end or ar^UyO^, or ratti- er trifling, w.th fuch fort offa^uciLS.* J'^ckjan\ ^r. fence of liberty a^ainft Qau\ latteis, p^ ^^^ t>S*
ly an extrinfic ^aufe ? 49^
^e not the caufe of them themfelves ? By whom or what i^ the ftate of men's will determined ? According to Mr. Edwards, it is the ftrongefi: motive horn Without. But motives to choice are exhibited to the riiind by fome agent : By whom are they exhibited ? In regard to finful volitions, we know that one man enticeth another, end Satan enticeth all mankind. But this will nor be given^ as an anlwer to ourqueftion ; fince the fin- ful adl of one ftnner in enticing another, and of Sarao in tempting all men, mud be determi- ned by a previous caufe-^an antecedent highed motive exhibited by fome other agent. (Though, by the way, it may be difficult to (hew, how one man can be the caufe of fin in anoihcr, when he cannot be the caufe of it himfelf; What we are enq-iiring after is, the caufe of * the fr/l and leading finful volition, which determines the whols Affair.^ Nor is there any ftop,till we arrive at the firft caufe, 'whofe immediate condudl Mr. £^- w^j faith, is firft in the feri^sof events, con' nedted with nothing preceeding.*
Will it now be faid, that GOD is the caufe of thofe difpofitions of heart, and a6ls of the will, which are fo odious in their own nature? On Mr. Edtuards*s fcheme this mud be faid. For the adls of the will, not being necefliry in their iwn nature, but by connection with a caufe that is fo j and no caule being thus necelTary but he who exifted from eternity, it undeniably fol- lows, that every finful volition proceeds ultimate- ly from him, as the caufe and fourcc of it. And to (ay, that the volitions themfelves are vicious, but that the caufe is not fo, equally militates agaJnft Mr. Edxvards'^ own fcheme, and commoa icnfc.
O2T
j;o Whether ihe will he necejfarily determined
On reading fedlion r. parti V. of Mr. Edwards^ s book, it was matter of much furprize to find a gentleman of his abilities ufing fo weak an argu- ment, defcending to fo thin a lubtili:y, as this, *' that theeffence of virtue and vice is nor in their caufe^ but in their nature*' The pains taken with this, (argument (hall we call it ? ) the flrels laid upon it, is indeed no mark of a good caufe. But fince every thing advanced by fo eminent a writer may be thought to jnent attention, we fhall briefly confider the fubj^dt of this fection. IVir. Edwards^ own reafoning will aiTift us here, as in other parts of thefe remarks.
For 'there cannot be more in the effedl thaa in the caufe.' ( bz. ) Volition therefore cannoc be virtuous or vicious farther than it's caufe is fo. We may not detach the nature of effefts from the efficient. ' It may be wickedneis ia the caufe, that ic produceth wickednels.' Suppo- fing then, that ' the wicked ad of the caufe in producing wickednefs, is one wickednefs ; and the wickednefs produced another' — what follows IS, that in every finful volition there are two wickednefTcs — one chargeable to the caufe, the other to the fubje(5l of the volition. Now if the caufe be 'diverfc from the fubjedl oP volition, how doth it relieve the difficulty at all, if upon the fcheme of neceffary conneflion, GOD (lands chargeable with doing wickedly ? And is not this the plain conftquence of the dodrine, *thaC the a6ts of the will are indiflfolubly connedcd with a caufe that is neceffary in it*s own na- ture' ? And if It will be allowed, that GOD can do wickedly confidered as the caufe of finful volitions, we may juft as well afcribc all moral evil to him,
SECT;
[5'1
SECT. li.
Whether the will he. necejarily. determined ^• an iniiinfic caufe,
Hov/EVER repugnant this hypotliefis Is t(> that already examined, yet it is frequent- ly made in- Mr. Edwards's book. Our bufi- nefs is not to reconcile him with himfelf, bus to remark on what we find. His meaning would d^ubtlels have been clearer, had the fubjedl he undertook been intelligible. He appears to have been bewildered at times in his own fubtilty.
To ray,that the a^s of the will are necefTary from internal, original bias, is not very confident wit!% faying, they are the necefTary effeds of an extrin- fic caufe. For what is this but faying, they are necefTary in their own nature } therefore not ne- cefTary by a necefTity of confcquence ? Yet Mr.' Edwards exprcdy afTerts, that every thing which ever had, or will have a beginnings is necefTary only by a necefTjy of confequence. Now if the adlsof the will areefTeds of an extrinfic caufe on* ly, then they cannot be the efFeds of an intrin- fic canfe alfo. But original bia^ ^nd inclination is intrinfic. If this therefore necefTarily determi- neth volition, then the other pofition of it's pro- ceeding from an extrinfic, coniequential neccffity," (an eternal, necefTary caufe) muft be given upj For ' how can ihefe things hang together * ? Or will any fuppofe, that Mr. Edwards when he faith, ' the itate or ad of the will is from the J deterrninatign
52- Whether the ivili he nicejfarlly determined
determination of an intrinfic caufe,' meant by this caufc the Deity inhabicing and a(5luating eve- ry intelligent creature ? by a pofitive efficiency producing every volition of theirs ? Such a fup- pofition, wc cannot believe any one will make, liowever neCeffary to reconcile Mr. Edwards to himfelf. This is a fenfc of GOD's wcrking in men to will^ and to do -, of cur living, moving, and jMiving our being in him, which we prtrfume none will efpoufc. For if it makes him the author cf mrtuous difpofitions in men, in the mod Jlrift and abjolute fenfc \ it will be remembered, that n alio makes him, in the fame fenfe, the author cf every vicious inclination and propenfity. On this hypothefis, there is properly but one agent in the univerfe,
* Moral necefTity,' faith Mr. Edwards, 'Wcs in the will, and is the will's propenfity. How then does ic lie in fomething exhibited to the mind from without, which is prior to the will, and gives ic a necciTary detc-rminaiiori ? Surely the will's propcnfiiy is not prior to it's propenfity. No- thing /;; the -iiill itjef cm be the moral^ neceflity by which it is determined, if this neccfluy be re- ally prior to will. Bcfides, to be determined by a caufe in iifelf, is to be felf determined, if words have any meaning. And moreover, this is making the will neccltiry in it's own nature. Both which are contrary to fuppofition. What confoundirg. again of caufe and effed ! Volition is the antcccdenr, neceffary caufc of volition ! The will is neceffarily determined in every ad): by a necefTity prior and fuperior to it •, and yec this neccfTiiy is nothing diverfs or diflindl fron\ volition' !
^creovcj
ly an intrlnfic caufe ? ^
•Moreover, if an intrinfic caufc, or origi- Ijal bias and propenfiry, be that neceiTiLy by which the will is determined, what is this but being <2ccermiried by nature ? For original propenfitf is »^//<r^/propenfuy. Original neceflity is ;?^- tural neccfilty. Agrcably Mr. Edwards faith, * Moral nectfCiy is a fpeciesof philofophical' — "^ ( Z94, 295. 30^. ) that ' mcvral events a- rife from nature as truly as othei:s.' (31,32.) Therefore, as was hinted before, moral neceflity, as truly as natural, precludes from praife or blame — and that for this^ood reafon, that moral ncceffity is natural. This is applicable to the pectfTuy of the firjl finful volition, if indeed it was neceflary before it, came to pafs- — And con- fequent finful volitions being the efFc6ls of the £ril, it equally holds as io. thtife alfo.
There feerns, indeed, to be fome difficulty, m regard to the principle impL-inced in the rege- nerate by the Spirit of GOD, upon thishypothe- :£s of Mr, Edwards. For he, we prefume, would nor deny, that they were born in fin ; anci that the bias in regeneration is changed faom what . It w^s by naiure. Confequently, the holintls ^nd perfeverance of the laints is not neccflliry . from native, original propenficy, but from fome other caufe.
Whatever may be faid in regard to the in- ability of fallen m:in \ Mr. Ed^ardsh principle bath equal refpe^b to the moral pov/er of man in innocence, and of the rebel angtjs before their fall, iheir original bias and inclination, it will be allowed, proceeded immediately from the crea- tor,
,.* AVwr-^j/ phi'orcphy, we conclude he mesnr — though ■ indeed, it is alike app'icabie to his tniral philofc^hj^, ■t-VfM ";h^t of many iccpticks in cur naiion*
j§4 Whether ils will he necejfartly determined
tor. If then their fm v;as the effed cfa recefH- Ty originally in their will, or was their will's ori- ginal propenfity, ic was fo entirely owing to the r,aturc cf thhigs, that (by ruppofitiois) it could not involve them in guilt — Or if connefled with the eternal caule, who alone is nectfTary in his •own nature, it could not upon out author's own fcheme ; be their fin. The whole guilt, if any, mud be i^npuicd to the firft caufi^. For the firll iin, of angtrls and mm, was once future ; and therefore could not be ncctflary in itlelf, but only by the aforefaid necefiiry of conkquence. (p. 25. ) And then, whatever . moral impoctncy now cleaves to mankind, or damned fpirits, ihis being conneded with the firll fin, which v;as •conncdted with the original, r;eceflary bias of in- nocence ; it iollows., that the fins of fallen cici- tures arc necelfary in the lame way that the fird •finful volition was — the only way in which all things and events whatl'oever, which are not eter- nal, are, or can be necelfary. They do not therefore partake of the effence of fin 3 or if they do, invcUe tht creator in it.
Indeed thefuppofition of be?ng neceffarily de- termined by original, .internal bias, dees, upon .the whole, lead to much the fame confcquences v/ith that of fuppofifrg the a6ls of the will to be necefiTary by a necefllcy of conf;<juence — fince, agreable to the fecond preliminary propofition, criginal bias mufi: be ultimately alcribcd to the oiiginal caufs of all things. ^Vhat is natural is the c >r fcitution of the author of nature. Mo- ral events, Mr. Edivards indruds us, are ow- ing, t artly at leaff, to the nature of things — pro- ceed, at lead in part, from natural caufes, Nov/, .by his own principles,, ii; far as the nature of
" ' things
hy an intrinfic can(e ? g^
things operates to their produdion, neither good nor ill defcrt is applicable to the fubject of voli- tion. Had he told us in whac rtfpedls, and how far, volition is owing to natural nccefiity^ we might have known v/nerein, and how t-Ax, the creature is accountable. For herein, and fo far, Mr. Jidwards g^:in{s/n [volition] js not pro- perly his own a6t — he is not- the proper lubjed of command, & c. ' *
If volition be partly owing to natural caufes, and the lubjedl lb far is not anfwerabi?: j what IS this but charging the moral turpi- tude of a fmful volition on GOD, fi far as it is the . effici of nalural neceffit'y ? Now as well may we attribute the whole moral turpi- tude lo God, as xhc haji msiifure of it.
It moreover follows, that the holinefs of the angels, who never finned, being among
.thofe moral events which are owing to the nature of things, is no holinefs ; unworthy of praife. The lame thing follows with refpedt to the holintfs of the man CHRIST JESUS„ and of GOD himrdf. For 'natural necefTi- ty is wholly inconfiltent with juil praife and
. blame.' And would Mr. Edwards deny, that the holinefs of GOD, his moral reditude in gene- ral, is neceffaiy z>/ if s own nature ? And what is this, but to be necefTary by^aw^/ar^^/necefTuy ?
Farther, by Mr. Edwardsh principles, all virtue and vice in creatures is native or original. For every a6t: of volition is the necefTary effe^ of internal, original bias — i.e. is owing to the original frame of the mind. The angels thac i"eli,anJour cornm;n progeiiitorsj were there- fore
g$ Whether the will he meceJJ'arily 'determined
fore 'made with a fixed, prcvail-ng principle of fin ixT the heart * Ochtrv^/ile tncir fin proceeded not from internal, origiiial bias — any more than from an 'indiiToluble connexion wiih a caufe ne- celTary in it's own nature/ If in truth their ori- ginal bias was not to evil-^if fhey were endow- C'J with the moral image of GOD, then their fin- ful volition was not the effect of original pro- pcnfifcy — nor did the neceiTity of it lie in the wilt^ in it's primitive ftate. Nor confequtntly will this account for the permanency of holinefs in the an- gels in heaven. This cannot be the rationale ^i the abiding principle of holinefs in them ; fince St appears from fidl, that creatures endowed with •t4ie moral image ofGODimay deface and forfeit ir.
Suppose 'the efience of virtue and vice lie* In the nature of volition, not in the caufc' ; it then follows, that the intrinfic caufe, the internal bias or propenfity (which is fuppofed to be the moral neceffity that determines the will) is not that which conHitutes the goodnefs, or wiv.ked- nefs, of th^ acts of the will. A vicious man's bias and inclination to fin, is not that which makes him finful ; the tfTence of his fin Iving not in fuch bias or inclination, but in the nature of the wicked thing. A llirewd folution ! as if the <:hara61-cr of moral agents v/ere no: always eili- •mated from their propenfity to good or evil. If 'moral recefTity lies in the will, and is the will's propenfity,' ic either follows, that there is no good or evil in any difpofitions implanicd in the hearts of men by nature ; (contrary to affcrtion, ■p 3^3') or if tntrebe any o;ood or evil in fuch difpofitions, this is c.itirely a didind goodnefs or wicktdnefsfrom the volhioni themiclvcs, which they arcthc caufc of, 'ic would i.Tsply a conirti-
, diCtioa
iy an intrinfic caufe ? ^
didion to fuppofe, that thefc two arc the fame iti- dividual' goodnefs or 'wickednefs. Thc'good or •wicked a6l ofthc caufe, in producing' goodnefser •wickedncfs is one' goodnefs or 'wickcdnris ; and the' goodnefs or 'wickedncfs produced, if there be any produced, is another.' Will this be called arguing ! What doih it amount to ? The plairt truih is, that when we fe: ourftlves to judge of human adions, we mud have noconfideiation of the fource of them, buc entirely detach them from th.ir caufes. Be the efficient who or what it will, ail we have to attend to is, the effed pro- di'ced — by this we muil eftimate the goodnefs or wickcdntf. of men, whciher they determine themielves, or are determined ab extra — whether they have power over their own wills, or have not. He therefore that with one original talenc makes as great improvement as another with five, is no more praifeworthy — that is, is not ac- cepted according to that he hath. He that offends againft five degrees of light originally given, is guilty in no higher degree than he that offends againft but one degree of light. The volition. Or ad, in both cafes, we fuppofe to be the fame in regard to the fubjed matter of duty cr fin — the lame alfo in the general nature thereof. What then is the reafon of different degrees of punifhmenc for the fame crime in different per- fons ? Not the nature of the crim^e as abfirad- cd from tr.c circmnftances of the agent, but as ccnneded and compared herewith. Now if men are not the caufe of their own volitions, then a determination to fin againft ten degrees of light differs not]iing from the like determ,ina- tion againft a fingle degree of light : In both cafes, the determination itfelf is alike neceffary ^i^d un^yoidablc. So that there is no foundaiioa
5? Whether the will he necejfarily determined
for different degrees of guilt ; becaufe, though we are won't to fpeak of luperiorand IcfTtr ad- van-ages, yet there is no real ground for this dlftin(5lton, intelligent creatures being in no cafe the cut-Ivors, the ..vol unrary dcfigning caufe of iheir in.wfard determinmions ; at lealt not of the firil and leading a6t, which decides the whole matter. How i;hen, without having recourfe to the cauie, canj.we judge of i\\'t naiute of fin ? lN;D,fiED had Mr. , Edwards {x^ccttcci in his atten-'pf to (hew, that the ''tfTnce of virtue and vice is -not in. thtircauie, but in their nature*', he would not have obviated the objtflion fo of- ten made to the do<^lrine of necctTity, but nevtr anfwcred, that it is charging GOD with fin. . >Foi^ ad?nitiing,GOD to be the original caufe of volition, but that being the caufe of a fir.ful yolit'ion in the creature is a diftindl wicked* ntfs kom that which the caufe produceth in the t^V^l •, ifill the Ibpreme caufe is fuppofed In fault i is charged ^nih prc-duci?ig^\n. Tntre i^ no evading the eonfequencejndeed, rh.at the who'e guilt of men's evil difpofiiionsis chargeable on- GOD, not themfclvcs, or on blind neceffity and fatality, if the things Mr. Edwards advanceth be true. For who will charge another with vvdiat Ive is acknowledged not to be the author or caufe of ? If therefore men's volitions are virtuous or vicious, and they not the defign-- ing caules of them ihemfclves •, { which Mr. Edwards throughout his book faith they are not ) it follows, that the virtue or vice of their volitions is to be afcribed to the caufe, whoever or whatever this caufe is. This cor-^ fequtnce may appear more plainly to follow from the icheme oi necefnty we are exami-^- ning, in the fiieceeding fedions.
- •" "" gECT,
SECT. Ill
Upon Mr* Edwards'; own Scheme^ there cannot be natural Libtrty without moral.
WE acknowledge the title of this fciflion contains a poHfion direcSlIy repugnant to Mr. Edwards^ whole fcheme, and yec trud we fnall make it appear that the thing alkrted plain- ly follows frbm things he hath advanccvd.
Liberty with re^pe(5t to natural aflions can be neither more nor lefs than according to the freedom of the ^///, cr mind. For natural ani- ons, by luppofition, are dependent andconfequenc on, the fruits and effefls of, the will's determi- nation, which is the caufeof them. Now 'there cannot be more in the effed than in the caiife. Thofe things which are indifTolubl/ cOnneded with other things that are Leceiiary, are them- felves neceffary.' Therefore if the acfls of the will are necefTary, thofe outward acls, which arc the etfefts of necefiiiy in the will, mud be ne- cefTary ' by a necelUcy of confequence.' Now eve- ry a6t of the will is faid to be ntceifary. ' The foul itfelf is the obje(5tof fomething adlingupon, and influencing it. The firfl and determining zCi of choice, which decides the whole affair, is out of our power.' So that in natural adions we are ^cati/dd to a6l by fome other agent.' Mr. Edwards faith, ' it is no more a contradiction, to fuppofe that a6lion may be the efled of fomc Itbcr caufe, befides the ageni or king that a6ls.,
K than
t6 Upon Mr, Edwards'j Scheme, there
than to fuppofe that life may be the cffefl of fomc other caufe befides the liver, or being that lives, in whom life is caufed to be.' * ( 286. )The afti of the foul or will being, therefore, neceflary cfFc6ls of fome other caufe than the agent, let it be fhewn how there can be fo much as natural liberty — meaning hereby a freedom from out- ward conftralnt or reftraint.
Mr. Edwards aflerts, *The liberty of the will is not cxcrcifed in any thing but what the will doei^, (99.) * The will in no inftance whatever is it's 6wn determiner'. Therefore the liberty of ihe will is not exercifed in any of the determinations of the will. Therefore not in determining to move the body. Therefore corporeal aftion is not vo- luntary. Therefore the will does nothing There- fore It is exercifed in nothing. Mr. Edwards promifeth to 'demonftrate',. that ' if the fir/l a6l in the train, determining and fixing the reft, be not free, none of them all are free.' And afTcrrs, that ' GCD's own immediate condudt is original in the lerics.'
In one word,cxtcrnal a^lion is no more in our power than internal. To fay that the will deter- mines the former is not true : For this would be to fuppofe it is its own determiner at lead in this particular determination to move the body ; con- trary to alTertion, that it is in no inftance whatever it's own determiner. But fuppofe material adlions to be determined by the will, that herein men arc the voluntary caufes of their own adlions — this is really attributing no power to thewillor agent-^ fincc all the adtsof the will fuppofe an anfwcrabic
caufe
* Ii a man active in that adl by which he is brought into being ?
cannot he natural Liberty without moral. 6i
caufe without, as much as creation fuppofetha xrcator. (62.)
If material a6lions are fubjedl to, andcommaed- ed by, the will, ftill this is fubjcd to and deter^ mined by preceeding neccfTity. So that natural liberty is given up. For that is a ftrange kind of liberty, which is founded in, and refulu out of,
• RecelTity. Whether this ncceffity be natural or moral — whether it proceeds from an extrinfic or intrinQc caufe, it equally militates againft the fup- poficion of freedom. The intelligent fy Item is a curious piece of mechanilm.
•Page 2^2 (and clfcwhere) Mr, Edwards hath an evafion, which Icarce deferves a ferious an- fwer. It is this, * that a man may be faid to have a thing in his power, if he has it at his tle5lioni i. e. if he now pleafeth, and has a dire^ and imme^ diate defirc for it, he is not unable to do \lJ^ This^ in tnoft writers, would be efteemed mecr quibbling. For if a man is morally incapable of a ' dired and immediate defire' to a thing, how can he be faid to .have it in his power ? Would Mr. A"^te;rtr<yj fay, that things are in or out of men^s pGvver,farther than chufing sr %efujing is fo„ as well as the conftquent ads depending hereon ? It is not improper to fay, ' that a perfon' cannpt
* perform thofe adions, which depend on an 3.3: of will, when the ail of will itfelf cannot be pre-
,fenr, but is forever impofllblc' — when the dif- poficion to the contrary is Vas flrong and im- moveable as the bars of a x^ftle,' by nature---- when want of iisclination proceeds from m- ,dure •, or original bias. For ' the event^is de- pendent on it's caufe;' And the caufe not being put, the event cannot take place. Ad- miumg th;£t luch a^ ftate pf the .will may he
,reiiuircd
62 * upon Mr. Ed^SLvdb s fc hem f there^ &c.
required as is forever impolTible -, this can be onJy on a fuppofition of an ability once gi- ven and pofll'lTcd, but loft. "Who will fay, that a man has in his power what is and mud be irnpofTible ? So that when we are told,
* that the common people, in their notion of a faulty or praife-worthy deed, fuppofe the man does it in the exercife of liberty ♦, but that their norion of liberty is only a perfon's having opportunity of doing as he pleal'cs' — • i. e. of executing a choice already made, we m.uft efteem this trifling. Fo-r what liberty is there \Mh^w choice itleU is out of a man's power — is the efftd of an antecedent neceflary caufe ? *]n the firjl zOi of choire, which decides the whole miaxicr,/ he is nccefTarily determined. ]n this Pv^r, Eciuards conftanrly aiTerts a man has rot power, or liberty of choice, while he grants him a power or capacity of cGn/eque7tt choice. Than j-S in other words,, a capacity of bei.n^ a^ed up- on by feme other caufe or agent. -• "
Ux'^ON the whole : Mr. Kdwards allows, that liberty is efiential to praife or blame, .-reward or punifnment ; but teacheth, that the internal ftate of the mind or will proceeds not from, is not determined by, ourfelves. "^ rxternal adion on- ly is deicrmimed by us. With what truth and propriety even this can be faid on Mr. Edwards*^ fcheme, we trull is fufficicntly manifcft.
SECT.
* Quaere, V/hether Mr. £iw^r^/s rrotto at all favors this opin'on ? it is taken from Rom. ix. xvi. // is mt of him that willeih. 1 hat is, ( if we attend to the words taken by therrfelves, or in their connexion) €uii^ard G^ion is not bfh'mthat willcth. It is Tup- ;pofed he hafh willed, and that the will hfrcm him- felfi—UiKi that liiiieth. But he hath not power or (Opportunity to pxeciite his will. IJaac did really will to give the blcilmg to ii/^z<' — Efau did run for venifoa
^,to obtain ic. But the will of the one, and the i un- fair g of the Other, were ovcr-iuled*
SECT. IV.
Of GOUs hein^ the Author of Sin, upon Mr. EdwardsV Scheme ef neceffuy \ and in what Senfe he admits this to be the Confequence of his DoBrine.
MR Edwards teacheth, ' That GOD, when he had made man, fo ordered his circum- Itances, that ftom tbefe circumftances^ together with the withholding divine influence and afTift- ance, his fin infallibly followed' And when ic is aflct^d hereupon, * why might not GOD as well have firft made .man with a fixed, prevail- ing principle of fin in his heart ?' Mr. Edwards intimates in his anfwer, that GOD might indeed have done .fo ; but adds, that if man had been thus made at firft, ' it would not have been fo 'vifible, that fin did not arifc from GOD, as the pofiiive caufe, and real fource of it — that there- fore it wos mtet man fhould not be made with fin in his heart, that fin might appear to arife from the imperfedion of the creature, and not from GOD as the efficient or fountain.' He al- lows GOD to be the author of fin in any fenfe but being ' the agent ^ or a8or of fin, or doer of the wicked thing.' He 'difpofeth the (late of events in fuch a manner, that fin moft certainly follows therefrom. In fuch a {t'^{^i I do not deny, that GOD is the author ol- fin. It is no reproach for the mod high to be thus the au- thor of fin. In fuch a manner GOD is the orde- rer and difpofer of fin, though not the a^or of it, ^or doer of the wicked thing.' ( Part iv. fe(^. 9> io.~ and p. 402, 408.
Now
^4 ^02) the Author of Sin;
Now how doth it appear, on thcfe principles; that God is not the pofitivc caufe, and real fource of moral evil ? Every one perceives a difference between doing (or being xh^JuhjeB of) a wicked thing, and being the efficient cauje and fountain of it — Mr. Edwards allows, thaj the moral turpitude lies wholly in the inward pro- penfity, and can no farther be applied to the cor- poreal aflion, than as a vicious^principle is fup- pofed to be the fource of it. If then we have no power of felWeterminationin relation to the internfil a6ls and exercifes of the in;nd — if the only thing wherein human liberty confifts, is, a power of executing what is already willed — if volition fprings not from man as the fource, caufe, or efficient of it^ — if he is only ihtfubjeff^ the doer^ the aSfor of fin— Who then is the po- fitive caufe and fountain of it ? if not the crea- ture, who but the creator ? Every thing but the a5iion or doing of wickednefs, Mr. Edwards cxprelly affirms GOD to be the author of, and faith It is no reproach to him. So that unlefs he would confound caufe and effi?^ — unlels he would allow men to be ' the dcfigmng volun- tary caufe of their own volitions •,* (which I;ic conftandy denies) there is no evading the confe- quence, that GOD is the fource and fountain, the pofitive caufe and efficient, of moral evil — yea, Mr. Edwards faith, that he ' decifively or- ders all the volitions of moral agents by a pofi- tive influence'— (4.03) which is nothing Icfs than faying in exprels terms, that he is the pofitivc caufe and efficient of them.
Mr. Edwards's notion of human liberty, ,a$ beincr exercifed and concerned in outward a'fli- ons only, in contradiftindtion from an inward power of felf-dctcrmination (or aiflivity in voliti-
Mpon Mr, EdwardsV Scheme of Neceffjt'y, 65
•« — or liberty in the mind or will) if viewed in it's diredt and immediate conrequences, we think muft appear to fubvert the very foundation of religion and morality. This appears to be the plain confcquence by his own principles. For he very juftly obferves, that 'the eflence of all moral good or evil lies in the internal inclinaci- ons, dilpofuions, volitions* — that as thefe 'are the caufe of outward adlions, fo the moral good or evil of fuch aftions doth not lie at all in the aflions them/elves, which taken by themfelves are nothing of a moral nature •, but in the internal inclinations and volitions which arc the caufe of them' — (27b) that 'vice and virtue lie in the ftate or frame of the foul^ and in this only* — that ' the very willing is the doing ; v/hen once a man has willed, the thing is performed, and nothing clfe remains to be done — that the will itfelf is the proper object of commands, as well as thofc anions which are the effects of the will. It is manifeft the Joul only is properly and diredly the fubjed of precepts or commands, that only being capable of receiving or perceiving them. The motions or (late of the body are matter of command only as they are fuhjeii to the foul, and conneded with it's afts. ' ^ Now \i inward freedom enters not into the notion of human liberty (33, 38, 39,40, 131, 132, 189, 194, 113,-215, 234, 236,256,-289, andfajfim.) then we are not free in that wherein lies the ejfence of virtue and vice : And if we are not free in this refpeft efpecially, how are we free in any fenfe that is of the lead importance ? how can we be virtuous or vicious, if liberty (as Mr. Edwards grants) is neccflary to moral good or «vil ? Yea, if wc are not free with refped to the
thoughts, ; Part 3. Scft. f & 5^
66 COT> tfie Author of Sin,
thoughts, affe(5lions and purpofes of our heart.v our inward inclinations aad volitions, hath not Mr. Edwards fllewn undeniably that we cannot be free in regard to outward adions ? 'If there be a feries of ads, the deter fnimng ad is more efpecially the fubjed of comn^and— becaufe ic is this ad that determines the whole afniir.' So that we are not at liberty in that which deter- mines the whole chamber. Nothing can be more futile than the evafion, that ' the eflenee of vir- tue and vice lies in the vature of volition, not ia the cauje" — as if meer effcds might be virtuous or vicious, and the caute that produceth them not fo — Or fuppofing the caufe (of a finful vo- lition, for inftance ) to be vicious, as if ihcpaffrce cffed would be another and diftmd wkkednefs. Befides, if the fubjed of fuch a volirion, who is altogether paiTive herein, is vicious notwithftand- ing, then how is liberty neceffary to praifc or blame ? If he is vicious at all, he is fo on account of the volition itfelf, and on this account only — Whether he has power or opportunity to exe- cute the volition, does not come into confide- ration.
Moreover, outward adions being determi^ ned by the will, and partaking of the nature of moral good or evil only with reference to their caufe, viz. rnternaF volition — how is this (inter- nal voruiony virtuous cr vicious in it's cwn nature^ w'hen the ads of the body ate not ? Volition hath a caufe, a prior determiner, no Icfs than external condud. Why then are outward ads declared virtuous or vicious only with reference to their caqfc, while this is denied of volition ? Hath every ad cf • volition m antccedentj nccertary
cauf*^
upon Mr. Ed^vards'; Scheme cfT^ectJfity. 67
caufe, which d<?terminech not only volition, bur, of confecjiience, outward actions ? And is not the virtue or vice of volition to be attribu- ted to its caufe, as much as the evil of external a'Sls to the inward difpofition and determinati- on ? ' Thus* Mr. Edwards's ' notion of liberty, confiding' m external freedom, ' is repugnant to itfelf, and fhuts icfeif wholly out of the world.*
Were it indeed true, as Mr. Edwards inci- dentally oblerves, (contrary to the general doc- trine of his book, and his whole fcnene) that we ' have command over our thoiiyhts' — (p^ ^94) that ' the a(5ls of the will are free' — thac ' ihQ Juul has freedom' — (p. ti6, 224) this might folve the difficulty, as it would be to make men the voluntary deQgning caufe of ihofe inward ads wherein the nature of ^virtue and vice c^n fills. But, as before obferved, Mr. Edwards conllantly denies an inward principle, fource, or pov/er of activity — and blames thole divines who contend for the freedom of the foul in willing. He allows, that a man hath ' pow- er to move his body agreably to an antecedent a61: of choice, but not to ufe or exert the facul- ties of hisfouL' (p. i^i) How then ' hath the foul a power of volition or choice V (p. 39) of chilling for inllance, to move the body, wheu it hath not a power of exerting its own facul- ties ? How much more confident would it have been for Mr. Edwards to have faid, thac the will's deter'mining is a nesejfary determining — for the foul to adt necejfarily is evermore to adt necelTarily ? — (that is, the will does not determine,, the foul does not ad) than to fay, ' the will's determining is 2ifrse determining — for the foul to ad voluntarily is evermore to ad fk^ivilf ^
L The
€i GO'D the Author of Sin, upon
The will, the foul, may be a^ed upcn^ and have fuch a volition or choice produced in it, in con- fequencCi and as^ihc effe5l^ of fonne caufe operat- ing on i% deciding and determining the volition. What Mr Edwards calls the foul's voluntary^ thrive ads, are the efi-eds of a caufe indepen- dent on man. The ads and exercifes of the human mind (if they may be called its ads) are owing not to any adive power in the mind^ to any thing within its power, but entirely to the energy of a necellary caufe, which is prior to what are called its own ads. Volition is free or voluntary with a freedom cf moral neceffuy — a ncctflity cs ahfolute as natural. And thus it is, that a man's heart comes to be wrong or right.
Mr. Edwards teacheth, that GOD ' orders the volitions of moral agents, among other -events, with fuch a duifive difpofal, that the events are infallibly connedled v/ith his difpo- fal— that an univerlal, determining providence in- fers an infallible, previous fixednefs of all c- vents — that GOD's own immediate condud is firft in the feries, and this alone unconneded with any thing prececding — that he caufeth the difpofition of the mind to be more in favour of fuch ads' — (vicious no lefs than virtuous) ' or bringeth the mind more into view of powerful motives and inducements' — that all things are invariably fettled — and ' necefiity be- longs to all moral agents.' His fchcmc, upon th'^ whole, appears to be nearly the fame with that exhibited by the celebrated Mr. Hume, aa epicurean atbeift, which we fliall give the reader in his own wor is, 'There is a continued chaia Qt nccelTary caufes, forc-ordaincd, and pre-de- ^ ~ ' termined;^
Mr, Edwards*j Scheme of NeceJJiiy: 69
termined, reaching frarn the original caufc of all to every fingle volition of every human crea- ture. While we adl, we are, at the fame timc,^ a6ted upon. The ultimate author of all our vohtions is the Creator of the world, who firft beftowed motion on this immenfe machine, and placed all beings in that pofition, whence eve- ry fubfequent event, by an inevitable necefficy,' mull reiult.'
To this fcheme, Mr. Hume fuppofeth it will be objeaed in the following form. ' Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from fo good a caufe ; or if they have any turpitude, they in- volve our Creator in the fame guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ukimar.e caufe and author. Wherever a continued chain of ne- cefTiry caufes is fixed, that being, either finite or infinite, who produces the firft, is likewife the author of all the refl, and muft boih bear the blame, and acquire the praife, which belong to them. Our clcareft and moft unalterable ideas of morality eflabliih this rule upon unqueftion- able reafons, when we examine the confequen- ces of any human adion ; and thtfe reafons muft M\ have greater force, when applied • to the volitions and intentions of a being mfinitety wife and powerjul. Ignorance or impotence may be pleided for fo limited a creature as man 5 but thofe imperfeaions have no place in our Creator. He forcfaw, he ordained, he intended all thofe adions of men, which we fo rafhly pronounce criminal. And we muft conclude, therefore, either that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accountable for them. But as either of thefe pofitions is ab-
■Jd GOD the Author of Sin, upon
furd and impious, it follows that the do^bine from which they are deduced cannot pcfTibly be true, as being liable to all the lame objections. An abiurd ccnfcquence, if ncceflary, proves the original do61rine to be abfurd, in the fame man- ner that criminal anions render criminal the original caufe, if the conne<^!on between ihtm be neceiTary and inevitable/ ^
This cbje(flion, which Mr, Hume dates to h'mleif, may be made'^with the lame propriety to the general feheme of our autnor. From 3Vir Hume\ answer, it is lufficiently manifeft what his prin4::pics were. H;:; tells us, ' Ic is not pofiibie to e, plain diftindly, how the Dd- ty can be the immediate caufeof all the adicns of miCn, Without being the author of fin and iporai turpitude. Theie are mylleries, whtcb meer natwai and unojfijhd reafcnis 'v en unfit io handle \ and whatever- i'ydem it tmbraces ic muft find itielf involved in inextricable difficul- ties, and even contradidtions, at every ilep which k takes with regard to fuch fubjeds.' f
Mr. Hume acknowledgeth, that upon his fcheme, the Deity is the mediate^ original caufc of all the adtions of men ; and virtually admits the confequence ♦, (that he is therefore the au- thor of fm and moral turpitude) by obfcrving, that it is not nrfiible diftin^'ly to explsin, how he can be the one, and not the o'her. Now let it be ihewn, that Mr. Edwards's icheme is not ' \ * liable
^EfTays fey David Hume ^ Efqj vol. iil p^ 15 r, 152, ^ Ibid p. 156.
Mr. Edwards'^ Scheme of Necefftty: ji
liable to the foregoing objedion, or admitting the objedion, let the confcquence be fliewn not to follow, and it will afford no fmall fatisfadlion to many, who are geatly embarraffed with Mr, Edwards'z fheme of neceflary conne^lion. Whoever examines part ii. ^td:. 3d," 4th, 9th, I2th, and 13th. Fart iii. fed. ^d, 4th, and 6th, Part iv. feci. 9th and lOrh, and the con- clufion of his difcourfc, muft, we arc perluaded, fee the objedion, as above dated, to be juft— . And if the confequence alfo be fairly drawn, doth it not prove the dodrine againft which the objedltion lies to be falfe and abiurd ? abfolute- ly irreconcilable with the moral character of GOD ?
SECT,
^2 "^he fuppcfed Ad-i/antage of
SECT. V,
On the fuppofed Advantage of moral Evil to the Umverfe.
HAVING taken notice of Mr. Edwards's doitrine, in afil rting GOD to be the au- tr.or of (in, except that he is not ' the a^or of n^ or doer of the wicked thing ; and the eva- fion which luch a dodrine ^leededy that ' the cfTence of a finfol volition is in its nature, not mii^ caii/c^ ', the next advance he makes, in order to reconcile the exiilence of fin with the divine choice and determination, in the invaria- ble ncccfTity of it, is, that moral evil is htjl for the world— that therefore * an infinitely wife being, who always chufes what is btft, mufl chi!lfc there fhould be fuch a thing' — that this is not chufing what is properly evil upon the whole, bccaufe ' of the great good which is the confequencc of fin, for the fake' of which GOD is fuppofed to ' will fin.' He therefore affcrts, that ' moral evil is not of^ bad^ hut '^ood ten- dency^— that ' the coming to pals of every indi-' vidual ad of fin is truly, all things confidered, agrcablc to infinite v/ildom ai'id *^oodnefs.* (Fart iv. fed. 9th.)
For all. this he quotes with approbation Dr. Tw-nb/il/f againd wnom he had before wrote and publifh-d pare of an elaborate volun-e.
Whea
moral Evil to the Univerfe. f^
When it is ailced, W^hence conies evil ? this Gen- tleman denies the hypothcfis, and anlwers, ' There is no evil in the untverje What ! is there no mifcry, no vice in the world ? or are noc thefe evils ? Evils indeed thty are *, that is, thofe of one fort are hurtful, and thofe of the other fort are equally hurtful and abominable : But they are not evil cr mTchicvous with rc- fpe6l to the whole. The ev^d which happens is rcquifue to the greater good*
That GOD may, and does many times, overrule things fo, as to bring good out of mo- ral evil, we deny not. From the apoftacy of mankind, he hath taken occafion to manifeft the exceeding riches of his grace. He alio fre- quently improves vicious and profligate finners (befidejand contrary to, their own intention) as inilruijopnts of great and general good. Bun doth i^hcrefore follow, that profligate wicked- nefs is not of bad, but good tendency ? That every individual ad of it is agreable to perfedt wifdom and goodnefs, and beft for the world ?
* Though the conftitution of our nature; from whence we are capable of vice and mife- ry, may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the pericdion and happinefs of the world ; and though the adual permiflion of evil may be be- neficial to it : (chat is, it would have been more mifchi^^vous, Bot that a wicked pcrfon had him* fcif 2.b^?i\x\tdi from his own wickcdnefs, hut that any om had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted :) Yet notwithfl:anding,it might have been much better for the world, if this very evil had never been done. Nay, it is mod jlcarly conceivable, that the very commifllon
of
74 Tbefu^pcjei Advantage of
of wlckednefs may be beneBcial to the world,and yet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, in the wife and good conftitution of the natural worlds there are diforders which bring their own cures ; difeafes, which are themklves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever ; yet it would be thought madnefs to afl!ert, that ficknefs is a bet- ter or a more perfedt (late than heaUh •, though the like, with regard to the moral world, has been alTcrced. "^
GOD's law. originally given to man, was doubtlefs good and per feci. It was doubtlcfs agreable to pcrfedl wifdom and goodnefs, that he (hould yield a fteady and uniform obedience to it. Thus he would have glorified his Crea- tor, anfwered the end of his being, and provid- ed for his own highetl happineis. BiK fuppo- fing moral evil to be no evil upon the whole, but a great good, fuch conieqaences as thefe will follow, rhat the law given to man at firfl: was imperfect — that it was better, all things confidered, that the divine law (the law of
man's nature) Ihould be broke than kept
that GOD threatned diibbedience with the pe- nalty of death, and ycr chofe man fhould rebel, * for the fake of the great good confequent on fin' — that the ends of infinite wifdom and good- nefs could be anfwered, no pofilbie way dcviri-d to advance the highejl haj^pinejs of the intelligent creation, but by the entrance of mfinite evil into the world — that the revolt of men and angels was in compliance with the end of their being,
and
* Butkr^ Analogy, edit. 4, p. J$8> 189;
moral Evil to the Univerfi, 75
aird the wtfe and gracious intention of the Crea- tor— (and if fo, ' why did not GOD make them at firftwith a fixed prevailing principle of fin V) Yea, it follows, that intemperance, debauchery, opprtfllon, murther, malice, envy, all the lufts of the ficdi and fpirit, greatly conduce to the good of the world, and are perfe^ly agreable to the wife and good governor of it. What obli- gations do mankind ove to drunkards and gluttons, to fornieators and adulterers, to the fraudulent and oppreifors, to thieves and liars, and falfe fvvearers, to robbers and murtherers, and all that great mukuude, whom the faithful and rrue witnels hath exprefsly excluded from the heavenly Jcrulalcm, and configned to one common lake of fire and brimftone ! * Which judgment according to truth the world have been wont to teftify their approbation of in their treatment of fach perfons — -that is, their greatelt bcnefa6iors 1 Bafe ingratitude I
Flow fin came to be permitted is more than we can comprehend. To fay it Could not have been prevented is faying more than any one knows. To fay that GOD chofe it, and deter- mined the will of the creature to it, is impious, "*ieven fuppofmg it is in fad followed with grea- ter good, than otherwile would have been — « which fuppofition is, however, but meer conjec- ture at brft, and without any folid foundation. For unlei's we can tell what would have been had fin never entered the world, it is impolTiblo we fhould be able to judge, by way of compari- fon, of the greater good confequent upon k ; ©r be able to fay, that ic was bcft upon the M whole,
* Rev, xxl, 8. and xxii. 15.
'j6 ^hefuppofed Advantage of
whole. From the miferies of ir, which we fee and feel, we have no fpecial reafon to infer its fuperior advantages, and good tendency. And notwithdandine ihe infinite reafon we have to receive it as a faithful faying^ and worthy of all acceptation^ that yESUS CHRIST came into ihe vjcrld to fave /inner s ; yet that he came to reflore mankind to a better ftatc than they would have been raifed to, had they never finned, is more than we have yet learned from the holy fcrip- lures.
Be this as it will : Sappofe It to be indeed true, that the conftquence of fin is the greater good of the univerfe, it will not therefore fol- low, that GOD mud chufe and dcterniine ir. If an apoflle fuppofed their damnation to be jufl, who do evil with a vicvv to greater good ; ihall we venture to impute any thing like this to GOD ? Suppofc (in the inflanccs Mr. Edwards brings) JofepFs brethren had foreseen the con- fequences of their treatment of him, would this have judified their condudl, and rendered it me- ritorious ? — what as w*ife and good men they muH: have chofe ? (p. 374, ^j ^) The fame quellion, on the fame fuppofltion, ofi^crs itfelf in relation to the murderers of our Savior. To fay that GOD wills evil for the fake of its good tendency, is a reproach to an holy and good be- ing, who cannet chufe moral evil at all — any mure than a man of reafon and confcience can chufe what he knows ro be finful, from the cleared profpeft of great publick advantage. The moral Governor of the world will puriue the happinefs of it, in fuch ways, and by fucli means only, as are juft and holy. And we might with more propriety fuppofc, he will not
take
moral Evil to the Ufiivcrfei 77
tike care of the happinefs of his creatures at all, than that he doth this by chufing fin as the on-^ ly jure means of the greatcll good. ^
Tke late Rev. Mr. Clap, Prefidcnt of Yale- Colicge, in Connedicut, in his ' hiftory and
vindication
* To admit that any created being can z€t in a manner contrary to what it does, or fulfil any other end, is tantamount, faith Mr. Collins, to allowing it to be . independent of the Deity ; and confequently, to have it in its ele(5tion and power to thwart the fchemes of the great author and fupcrintendent of all things, l^c. His anfwerer very juftly replies, * All this is nothing but fuppofing it a contradiction that GOD fhould endue the human mind, or any creature, with liberty of a£tion. For if liberty is a perfection poiTible to be communicated to any creature, it follows from the nature of the thing, that it muit be in t\\t pswcr and ek^ion of the agent^ to a6l in a manner contrary to -what it does, and to fuU .fit another end. But this liberty does not at ail infer that man is independent of the Deity ; any more than the power of breaking human laws infers that fub- jecls are independent of their governors. Man is ever fubjedit to the providential government cf GOD, and accountable to him for his a£lions ; and, as he does good or evil to himfelf or others, is liable to receive rewards or punifhments. This fufiiciently faews the dependency of man upon GOD ; and as much Co, as if his actions were neceffary. For as in the latter cafe, he would depend upon GOD as an in- J}ru7ncnt only in the hands of an agent ; or, as the inaiiimate creation depends upon him, meerly as a machine upon the framer and dire6lor of it ; fo in the former cafe he depends upon GOD as a moral governor, who fuperintends his adllons, and from v/hom he has reafon to expe£t to be recompenfed 2ccor Jing to his worlc— And no power whatfoever can deliver him out of GOD's hands. Is fuch a
. .creature then irJepsndmt of GQDP On the contrary.
7S ^hsfuppofed Advantage of
vir.dication of the dodlines of the Nrw-Eng- !and churches,' (p. 19J has exhibited * a new jcheme of reHgion,* which he apprehended was prevailing, in oppofition to thofe dodrines— ^Mentioning ' this fundamental principle' of the new fcheme, ^Yhat the happinefs of the creatuye h the fole end cf the creation^ the worthy Prtfi- dent remarks, ' Tbis naturally leads to moft^ ij not alitor the reft' (meaning all the other errors of the new fcheme of divinity.) ' For this .rnuft be i\iQ Jole rule of all GOD's condud to- wards us, and of ours towards him ; and it is certain, that GOD'sJoie end and ultimate defign can never be fruftrated.' Whether the Pre- ■fidenc had Mr. Edwards's book in view, is un- certain. W^ can only lay, that befides the au- " ' , ■ ^ '' ' ihors
as his fubjeiTtion to GOD's providential government and final judgment is the gteatcft, fo it is the only dependency which a rational creature as fuch can be under unto GOD.
Nor again, is it any confequence of liberty, that man will have it in his eU6iu7i and power to thwart ihe fchejTies^ and reji/} the will of the great author of his being — For, la^.! ofmg human liberty^ it miift be fuppoled from the nature of it, that the will ofGOD, and the fcheme of his government formed by it, is a moral providence and fuperintendency, like that of a rational movi2irc\\ over his fubje(Sl:s, who gives them laws, er joining obedience to them, and eftab'ifhing them v.ith the fandtion of rewards and punifhmentsi. It is the wili of GOD, that we (hould aSt freely ^ and have it in our power cither to do or not do his commardments, that he may appear to be a moral snd righteous governor, by rewarding thofe who £huje to do that which is right and good^ and by pu- nifhin^ thofe who wilfully commit evil' Jack/on s vindication of human liberty againft J, Collins^ Ei^i p. 56,— 39.
moral Evil to the Vniverfe. yg
thors particularly fet down, he mentions ' other books' from which he made his colledion of errors, without infor2iiing us who the authors were. But though we apprehend Mr. Ed- wards*s book as exceptionable as any mentioned by rhe Prefident ; yec we rather think this book was not in his view. For we were fome years ago informed, (and upon enquiry found it to be true) that this book was introduced by the Pre- fident to be recited by the ftudents of the col- lege— and Tuppofe it is flill continued.
SECT;
^o Obfervations mid Refledllons on the Scheme
SECT. VI.
Containing general Obfervations ^;/i Reflexions on the Scheme cf Necejfity exhibited in Mr* Ed- ., wards'j Book.
^TOTWITHSTANDING all Mr. Edwards % hath laid upon the diftindlion between na- tural and moral neceffity^ we cannot but think this * diilin6tion altogether inipertinenc in the prelent controverry.' For ' that which is neceflary, is necelTary, mud be, and cannot be prevented.' If there be a real necefiity on the mind in all its adts, it is quite immaterial whether this. necefTity, by which the mind is in every inftance determi- ned, be called natural or moral. Whether will and endeavour is overcome by external con- ftraint ; or v/hether fuch a ftate of the will or foul is produced by fome neceffary caule, extrin* fie or incrinfic, amounts to much the fame thing in the end. There is exa£dy the fame propriety in faying, that fuch a thing cannot be done, is im-pojjible^ unavoidable^ necejfary, &c, where there is a moral inability to it, as in applying thele epi- thets to 2.phyfical inability : For if the a<ft of the mind, on which the natural ad depends, be for ever impoffible, the natural ail mull be alike im- poffible — unlefs it be faid, that it is poffible an effect may be produced without a caufe. What Mr. Edwards haih faid to lliew, that natural a£li^
of Necejfity exhihlted m Mr. Ed ward s'i Book, 8 r
ons, which are determined by the mind, are pofH- ble, when the determination of the, mind itfelf refpedling them is forever in-ipofTible, is unfatifi fadory, and unintelligible to us. If no being can chufe or aft oiherwifc than he doth, we can- not conceive of a neceffiiy more ai)foIute ; and fuch is the neceffity maintained by Mr. Edwa^ds—^ only he approves not the terms natural necejfity ^ and thinks the word certainly more proper— While he afierts all events to 6e rMrally necelTa- ry — and that in things thus necelTary there is a ' connexion prior and [uperior to will and endea- vour.' ( 294. )
After all that hath been faid, moral neceffity is, properly fpcaking, natural 7teceffity \ moral power is natural power. The one is as original to us as the other. The latter is interwoven in our frame no othcrwife than the former. The moral faculty, or power, which Mr. Edwards faith belongs to moral agency, is a natural facul- ty or power. So that whatever moral capacity or incapacity is attributed to mankind, the fame is natural. If man is a law to himfelf it is hy na- ture that he is fo, having the work of the law wricten on his heart. And as to the inability of man, Mr. Edwards, we prefume, believed this to be derived from nature — to have it's fourcc in 'the want of original righteoufnefs, and the cor- ruption of the whole nature.' Now an inability which has it's fource in the very nature of man may furely be called a natural inability.
Much hath been faid to fhew, that every mo- ral event muft have an anfwerable caufe. Be it fo. Every fuch event mull then have a moral caufe. And whether any other than an intelU-
geni
$2 Obfervatlons andRt^c&ion^ en fbe Schema
gent mind can be fach a caufe, let thofe who have common undcrftanding judge. If it be admit- ted, that a moral caufc muft be a moral agent, then it will follow, that we are the caufes of our own volitions, or that our maker is the caufe of" them. Mr. Edwards denies the firft — iherefore our volitions are to be attributed to GOD as their proper caufe. But however this might be ad- mitted of holy volitions, v/e cannot think it will be admitted of Jinfu I ones. And if nor, what regard fhould be had to a dodrine of which thii is the direct confequence ? Wc are felf-decer- mined, or determined by the deitv. If there be any difference between a cau/e^ and a meer in- Jtrument^ the former denotes a n>ind that hath wifdom, power &c, in a greater or lefs degree, according to the effeds afcribed to it. And if moral events, through a chain of fecond caufes, centre in the deity, as natural effedls do, what is this but running up morals to inechanifm ? any pains Mr. Edwards hath taken to avoid fuch an imputation on his fcheme notwithRanding.
In our author's fcheme, necelTity is univerfal. The divine will is always determined by it, and the will of every creature. Now GOD Is either the author of this necefliiy, to which he himfelf is fubje6l, or he is not. If he is, then all the effe^ls cf it are to be afcribed to him as their proper caufe. If he is not, then there is foine caufe prior to the frjl caufe, binding and deter- mining hitr. — he is caufed to determine as he doth by fomething extrinfic ( For to fay he is determined by fomething intrin/ic, is to fay he is felf-dtter mined — contrary to fuppofition ) His being and volitions are effeots as much as thofe of linitc creatures. That necefliiy, which is
faid
cfNeceJfity exhibited in MnEdw^rds'sBook, Sj"
faid to be the caufe of every determination of the divine will, the caufe and ground of his ex- igence and perfedtions, is prior, by fuppofition, to his exillence and volitions. And this necef- fity mufl; be determined by fomething preceed- ing,and fo on. Yea, Mr. Edwards- makes exprefs mention of the caufe of moral neceffity — and fays, that the caufe of this neceffity is equally ne- cefTary as of natural. That is, there is a necef- fary caufe of this caufe, and fo on in infinitum: Thus we are run back far into noa-enticy, and have to enquire, By what caufe the firft caufe exitls — which caufe is an effe6t in relation to fomething preceeding, and this an effrd: with relation to fomething flill preceeding, ^c. i^c* And if fomething exterior and prior to the Dei- ty determines him, what is this but affirming him to be the almighty minifter of/^/^ ? How- ever IMr. Edivards hath exprefled his difinclina- tion to fatalifm, (in which we doubt not his iin- cerity) we think his reafoning is plainly on the (iJe of abfolute fatality -, and fuppofe he was caught in his own fubtilty. Upon his fchsmc it follows, that the actions of all finite beings are the agency of the Deity ; and his is not properly fpeaking agency, but in(lrumentality — ' a fubjedion to blind neceffiiy and fate. There is no felf- mover, fclf- direction, felf-detcrmina-^ tion, or fource of adivity, in the univerfe. ' Li- berty is banifhed out of the world — and ths world mult have been eternal.
Whether GOD could have a6led otherwife than he hath } is a curious rather than profita- ble enquiry. And as to the notion of fitneis of things, independent of the things themfelves, and wiihoac reference to the fovcrci^n mind,* ^' ^ N ■ It
$4 Obfervations and Refleftions on the Scheme
it is difficult even to imagine it ; to fay nothing of tlie impiety implied in Ibch a thought.
We have reprefented what we apprehend is the plain tendency, and indeed only ccnfiftenc fenlcjof the fcheme of neceffity before us. Whe- ther it was copied from Mr. Hume, Hohhs^ ^pi- noza, or any of the old heathen Philofophers we do not r?.y. We hint the thing becaufe of a remarkable coincidence we have exhibited ac the cbfc of thefc remarks, in fome extrads from ihem, fee over againft fimilar paflagcs of Mr. Edwardsh book. Though we have a right to renew valid objcdions, how oft foever they have been m>ade belore, until fome tolerable anfwcr is given to them (efpecially when the old doc- trines, to which the Ike objcdions were former- ly made, but not anfvirered, are received.; Yet we would not repeat the charge, without giving a fpecimen in fupport of it. We really are per- fuaded, that there can be no pofTible confutation of fatalifm on the principles of Mr. Edzz^ards^s book. Hefpeaks with fatisfadtion of the progrefs o{ metaphyfic fcience \ (325 j of which and its' ter- rible doings,' his own book, among others on fatality, is an alarming proof. [Epicurus, Mr. Edwards reminds us, was ' the father of at heifm and licentioufnefs.'* David Hume, Efq^ is the fa- ther of modern epicurifrn : And whoever hath read his effays and Mr. Edwards* 9> enquiry is better able to judge than one can from the ftw fcle(^l pafTages we have extracted, of the agrcer ment between them.]
Not that we fuppofe Mr. Edwards faw, or allowed, the tendency and confcquences of his fcheme to be fuch as we have here reprefented ;
he
wfNeceJfity exbihited in Mr, Edwards'^ Booh t$
he hath repeatedly declared the contrary. Still
if the confequences are fairly deduced — if in
' ofc pafTages wherein he profefTcs himfelf a
id to liberty he is cither repugnant to him-
or allows no liberty that is of any moment,
' connedled with moral agency — let any
reafon fay, whether his fcheme can be
^is dodlrine of neceflary connexion, if
dacible to the confequences we have
1, if confiftenL with itfelf ooly in that
\ave taken if, will be rejeded by all
due regard to the moral perfedlions
)r which w« doubt not in the leall
(wards had a fupreme veneration,
d good men. are not always wife.
'\niuch Mr. Edwards*$ method to
ons by endeavouring to reduce
his ?dverfaries to the fame abfur^
chough it be a good argument ad
10 means rttisfadory. We mighc
fome other anfwer in particular
ns of the fate of the heathen^
', making men machineSy making
of fin^%% well as other objedions, ,
/en. But as we may prefume
ve what appeared to him the
-jfe and fuch like objedions to
effity \ fo we conclude from
the fubjed, no folid anfwer
•fe objedions ; otherwife he
ed the world with fuch an
'vafivc ones. Though we
think thofe anfwers to ob-
we muft take the liberty
g6 Obfervations ^;^JRefie6lions on tbeScheme.Szc:
TiicuGH we think no book hath been pub- lifhed in this country of more dangerous ten dency, yet did we not at the fame time f pofe the author to have been a ferious believer of religion, natural and revealed' zealoufly concerned for the intcreft of p; godlinefs, we fhould not have taken the to enter on this puzzling fubjed of hi recefnty — which, as Mr. Hume remark jncft contentious queftion of meraph' inoft contentious fcience.' If what remarked is fufficient to fnew the dangerous confequences of admitti fary connexion of moral caufes and the beginning of the world, or a fr tion of moral ads with afuppofed i preceeding, as of natural events ^ i€s ; the inconfiftence of our ai -with itfclf y and the perfed futi' into nice dilquifitions on fuch^ jnain end ofthefe remarks hith' anfv/ered. But as it may be t ho Eo have done this in fome meaft ceeding to exhibit a fcheme m truth and reafon, this is what in the following part of our fu'
to moral Agents^ S9
their probation, poflcfs it in fome mcafure and degree.
Mr. Edwards^ as hath been Ihtwn, denies all felf-detcrmining power, and inward liberty — af- ferting, that ' tvery determination of the will in chufing and refufing is neceffary.' (p in, 113) But that an inward principle of adlivity, and power of volition or choice, belongs to mankind, we think is in a manner fclf-evident. For it is granted on all hands, that moral good and evil lie in the ftate of the mind, or prevailing internal difpofition of the agent. Liberty therefore, if at all necelTary to virtue and vice, muft be ex- ercifed in that wherein the nature of morality and religion confifts — that is, in the inward man. A freedom from external conftraint is a liberty belonging to fools and madmen, and to the brute creatures. Thefe, therefore, are as capable of virtue and vice, praifc and blame, as beings endowed with, and in the exercife of reafon, if this external (hypothetical) liberty is the only thing neceffary to moral agency. Fools, madmen, and brutes, if they are not bound or imprif&ned, have natural liberty. They have a power, faculty, or property called* wilh Their adlions are as voluntary (in many refpedls) as thofe of mankind, who are of a found under- ftanding. The adtions of brutes proceed from inclination and defign — an inclination and de- fign proceeding from nature, or internal, ori- ginal bias.
If then an a6lion's being voluntary (in the fenfe of Mr. Edwards's book) makes it virtuous or vicious, the lower animals are fo as really as intelligent creatures. As we arc not accuftom-
^ - ed
'^Cr Internal" Libert^ hekvgs
cd to tiilk of virtuous' or vicious herds of cattle,' the epithets, as applied to them, may found fomething odd and harfh at firft ; but by the help of metaphyfics we may in time be recon- ciled to fuch language. We are not, indeed, to fuppofe our oxen and horfes are morally good or bad in thofe acftions of tfieirs wh.ch are againft their m\h — to which they are externally impel- led— Or in regard to any inftances of forbear- ance, which are owmg to external impediment-—' to which they have a will, and endeavour to perform, but are hindered from doing as they would. But the caies of cca£lion and reftraint excepted, Itt it be fliewn, on the prefent hypothe- fis,that they are not proper fubjecls of commenda- tion or blame,reward or punifliment — and by the fame arguments we prefume it may be (hewn, that mankind are not. If power or opportuni- ty to execute a will or choice already produced by fome cxtrinfic caufe, be all that is meant by liberty, or that is neceflary to moral agency, li- berty is perfedtly ideal^ and the controveriy a- bout it is about a mecr word. But if liberty be really eflential to moral agency, as Mr. Edwards admits ; and if there cannot be liberty of adting or conduding farther than there is liberty of willing, chufmg, preferring, as hath been (hewn — the plain conlequence is, that liberty in the mind is effential to moral agency. Upon Mr. Edwards^ fcheme of liberty, it is not for the adts and exercifts of their minds that men arc accountable, but only for thtir outward actions. There is no moral turpitude in fuch a ftate of the foul or will as our Saviour defcribes. Matt, V. 18, 32, but only in the execution of fuch a difpofition. We know, indeed, that Mr. Ed- t^ards intcnded'ngc to afTcrt any luc^ thing as ' " " ^ " this,
to moral Agentsl 4^ii
this, that malice, envy, pride, impure defires; <^c. are innocent until they become effe(5ls : BuC is not this the confequence of his allowine;, that liberty is nscefTary to moral agency, while he makes this liberty confift only in a power a maa hzth to execute his will. If Mr. Edwards in^ tended not to aflcrt the above confequence, (as it is plain he did not) then in the enquiry where- in the liberty of man confifts, fom^ithing farther is to be confidered than material adlion — There mud be internal liberty, if liberty enters into the notion of a praife-worthy deed, or the con- trary. The proper queftioa, \%lVhether we have end exercife liberty in that wherein the nature of 'virtue and vice confijis ? And one might think this would not be made a queftion.
To fay that the mind is necefTarily determin- ed in all its adts, is making mankind necclTary agents in that thing which diftinguiflieth them from the inferior creatures. Without mo- ral liberty, it is plain their adlions cannot be of a moral nature, any more than thofe can be cal- led naturally free adlions, which proceed from natural neceffity. Abridge a man's natural li- berty ever fo much, his moral freedom may re- main ; and if it doth, the willing or unwilling mind is rewardable or punifhable. On the con- trary, fuppofe moral liberty taken away, or ra- ther, never to have been poflfeiTed, and there is an utter incapacity of moral action. *
O That:
f « Man cither has within himfelf a principle of aSlion^
properly (peaking, that is, a felf-moving faculty, a
principle or p9wer ofbtginning motion j or he has not.
U he has within himfelf fuch a principle, then he is a
Jree^ and not a mce£ar^ agm* For every majfarf
^i Internal Liberty belongs
That we have internal liberty is apparent^ from our moral di/cernment, that faculty Mr. Edvoards himfclf fpeaks of. We fhall reft the whole proof of our dodrine on this fingle point.
This
, cgent Is moved necejj'ar'ily by fomething elfc ; and
then that which mo'^ed it, not the thing itfelf which
is moved, is the trut and or.h caufe of the acftion. If
man has not within himfelf a principle or power of
' Jeif-motion^ then every motion and aSiion of man is ftridl-
. Jy and properly produced by the ffficiency of feme
., extrinfic caufe : Which caufe muft be either what we
ufually call the 77iotive or teajon, upon which a man
t^s ; or c^i(z it muft be fome infenfiblc fuhtle rrMtery
or (oHiCctker beirgox jubjlancevmk.\ng an imprcflion
upon him.
It tlie reafom or mauves upon which a n:an a£ts, be the immediate or effdent caufe of the e^ion ; then ei- - ther GlfiraSi notions ( as all reafons and motives are) arc \}[itv[\.\^\\Q% fiihjiances ; orelfe that which has itfelf no real fubfiancs can put a body into motion : Either of which is maRifeftly abfurd.
If infenfiblc y«^//^ matter^ of any other heing or fuh-* Jiance^ continually making impreffion upon a man, be the immediate and efficient caufe of his a6lin<y 5 then the rrotion ohhit fubtle matter or fubflance muft be cau- fed by fome other fubftance, and the motion ©f that by fome oiher^ till at laft we arrive at a free agent ; • and then liberty is a poffihh thing ; and then inan pofli- bly may have liberty : And if he m^y poffibly have it, then experience will prove that he probably^ nay, that he certainly has it. Jfwe w/i;^r arrive at any free caufe ; then there is in irfnitum a progreffion of mo- tions without any mover^ of effctts without any caufe^ t,hings <2J7/^ without any agent*
Dr. Samuel Clark's remarks on the < philofophical enquiry concerning human liberty,' wrote by J, Collins, Efqj p. 42, 43, 44.
The
tff moral Jgents. 9/
This mord difcernment, it is allowed, is the principal power that diftinguiflieth us from the brute creacion : In refpedt of this our ma- ;icer having taught us more than the beads of
the
The author oi Caio*^ letters replies to Dr. Claris ^ We fee and feel, that defires and fears, that abflra(5l rations or images of the brain, alter the difpofition of the whole fabric, and often dcftroy the whole con- texture of it.' ' This is true, fays his anfwercr (Mr. Jackfon) but nothing to the purpofe to fhew, that ahlhaB notions are the immedmte and effcient caufe of a^ion or active motion, which is Dr. Clarli% argument,
I GRANT that ahflraSi notions, fach as fuddenfur^ prifts^ violent pajjimsy oi madnefs will, by a forcible and irrefif^ible impu'fe, compel the mind to move the body ; in fuch cafes, though the ahflra£l notions, do not immediately themfelves move the body, yet (which is all one) they force the mind to move it whether it will or no j but then this motion( though called a5iion) is no more really or properly ^^/(?«,thaa the Tnoiion of a man, who is driven by a /jorm or whirlwindy is an a^ion. If it fhail ftill be infifled on^^ that every event or efftii^ howfoever produced, is an 6i£iion ; then the motions oi fijips and clocks are ^dlions, and all motion is a^ion, and there will be no fuch thing as pajjlon in nature : And yet ncverthelefs there will appear to be as much difference betwixt thefc natural motions and humin aS]io7is^ as between the ideas of mcsffiiy z.w\ freedom,* Jackfor}^ anfwer to C<2/A letters, p. 198, 19,9.
Dr. C/cjri,(in his * demonftraricn of the being and attributes of GOD,' (tenth edition p. 83, 86) hay argued the pcjjil/ility and reality of the communicatioa of liberty to man in i\\t following clear and conclu- i^ve manner. ' As a power of beginning motioia, is not in it/elf in impoffibie thing ; bccaufe it mult of liecefiity be in the fupreme caufe : So neither is it ii^ipoilitsle to hz CQupmnifaUd to erpAted bcir.gs. Th&
g^ r Internal Liherty Belongs
the field, and made us wifer than the fowls of heaven : In refpeft of this man is by nature a Taw to himjelf^ having the work of the taw written mi his heart.
That
Tcafon is plain : Becaufe no powers are impoflible t® be communicated, but only thofe which imply Jelf- ex'iflence^ and abfo^ute independency — 1 know, the maintainers ©f fate are very confident, that a power of beginning motion, is nothing lefs than being really independent, or being able to ail inde- pendently from any fuperior caufe. Bat this is only a childifh trifling with words : For a pow- er of idling independently in thii fenje^ commu- nicated at thepleafure of the fupreme caule, and con- tinued only during the fame good pleafure, is no more real and abfolute independency, than the power pf exifting — or than the power of being confcicus, or any €iker power whatfoever, can be faid to imply indepen- dency. In reality, it is altogether as hard to conceive* how conjctoufnejs^ or the power of perception^ fhould he communicated to a created bein^, as how the pow- er of fe If- motion {hoM]d be fo- Yet no man doubts*
but that he himfclf, and all ethers, have truly a pow- er oi perception. And therefore in like manner (how- ever hard it m?y be to conceive, as to the manner of it; yet fi nee, as has been now proved, it can never be fhown to be impciTible and exprefly contradictory, that a power o{ j elf' motion ftiould be communicated.) 1 fuppofc no confidcring man can doubt, but that he actually has alfo a power oi felf- motion. For the ar- guments, drawn from continual experience and obferva- tion, to prove that we have fuch a power, are fo ftrong, that nothing lefs than a ftricl demonftration that the thing is abfolutely impofTible, and implies an cxprefs contradic'^ion, can make us in the Icaft doubt that we have it not. We have ail the fame experience, the fame marks and evidence exadlly of our having real- ly a power of y^//-TOfl//W ; as the moft rigid fataiift could po^joly contrive to require, if he was to make '&cf<r^ofui(in.Qi^imris bsing endued with that pow-
t9 moral Agent si 95
That wc have a power of deliberating, judg- ing, preferring, will not be difputed, being mat- ter of experience. The perception of right and wrong, good and ill-defert, Mr. Edwards juftly obferves, ' is one of the firft ideas children have.'
This
cr. There is no one thing that fuch a man can ima- gine ought to follow from the fuppofition of /elf-mo^ tioHy which every man does not now as much feel and aSlually experience in himfelf, as it can poflibly be imagined any man would do, fuppofing the thin|; were true. Wherefore to affirm, notwithstanding all this, that the fpirits, by which a man moves the mem- bers of his body, and ranges the thoughts of his mind, arc themfelves moved wholly by air or fub- tler matter infpired into the body j and that again by other external matter,and To on ; as the wheels of a clock are moved by the weights, and thofe weights by gravitation, and To on ; without a man's having the leaft power, by any principle within himfelf^ to think any one thought, or impel his own fpirits in order to move any member of his body : All this is fo contrary to experience and the reafon of things, that unlefs the idea of felf- motion were in itfejf as evidently and clearly a coniradiSiian^ as that two and two fiiould make five, a man ought to ^ be afhamcd to talk at that rate. Nay, a man of any confidera- ble degree of modefty, would even in that cafe be al- moft tempted rather to doubt the truth of his facul- ties, than take upon him to alTert one fuch intolera- ble abfurdity, merely for the avoiding of another. There are fome indeed, who denying men the pow- er of beginning motion^ would yet feem in fome man- ner to accouni^. for their anions, by allowing them a power of determining motion. But this alfo is a mere ludicrous trifling with wbrds. For if that power of determining motion, be no other in a man, than that which is in a ftone to reflccSl a ball one certain wayy this.is juft nothing at all. But if he has a power of determining the motion of his fpirits anyway'^ as he himfelf pleafes ; this is in all refpedls the very fam^ ^^ tb^pQWsr of beginning motiGn,[
g6 Internal Liberty hekng^'
This faculty approves fome actions, and c^^^ demns others, detached from the confideratioQ of their eficdls and confequences. The exer- cifes of our minds, our thoughts, affections, de- figns, are the objed of this faculty, no lefs thaa the condudl they lead to. Yea, for thefe efpe- cially (if not only) it approves or condemns us, as thefe arc the foundation of life and condudl. In cenfuring or comn'^ending trie eondudt of others, we go upon a fuppofuion of intelligence anddefign : For wejudge very differently of the fai^ne adtions as performed by an ide©t, or mad- man, and by one in polfeffion of reafon. And ■when it appears that an adlion proceeded not from defign, or that a different and contrary purpofe was intended from what is a^ually ef^ fefted, our opinion of it is changed. We ap- prove good intentions, and condemn evil ones, in ourftlves, (and in others fo far as fuch in- tentions can be known) though evil comes of what was m^eant for good, and vice verfa.
Now our ef^.imating the moral charafter frorn internal difpofitions is on a fuppcficion that /^f/^ are within«the power of the agent. Whe- ther he fhall execute his will or not, depends not on himfclf. He may be hindered herefrom, or compelled to do contrary to his will — which alters not the internal character. If we are made the means or inilruments of what we do not intend, or are externally hindered from what we do intend, we are judged according to what we would have dons. The realbn is, that we have internal liberty in many initances, when we have not external. It is therefore much more proper to fay, that natural nt^ceffity, in any fupppfed cale, though it c/*cukth an external
io 'Moral /Rents'! ^
aft, or the omifTun of fuch an a6t, yet hinders not but the ftate of the will oiay be right or wrong in fuch cafe ; than to fay, that moral necefTity is confiftent with praife or blame, be- caufe not attended with natural necejfity. We are condemned or approved of ourfelves for a wil- ling or unwilling mind, and have a natural ap- prehenfion, that the judgment of GOD will fe- condour own. But did ever any man commend or accui'e himfelf for what he knew to be necelTary and unavoidable — not within his power, or not determined by himfelf ? The inward perturba- tion vicious men feel proceeds from a convidi- on that they might have cultivated another frame of heart. If external condraint, or natu- ral necefficy, renders a pcrfon incapable of fuch commands as rcfpedt material action, moral ne- cefiity, or internal conftraint, mud render him equally incapable of fuch commands as refpc6t the exercifcs of the mind^ or ads of volition — • (admitting this to be original^ and not the con- fequence of internal liberty abufsd.) We are faid to be the ' voluntary, defigning caufes of corporeal attion.' Be it fo, * the effence of vir- tue and vice lies not in their caufe.' And more- over, in a feries of ads, conne£led and depen- dent, the praife or blame is to be attributed to the original ad. But of this (which determines all the reft) we are not the voluntary caules. (p. 48, 224^ 156) To return from this fhort di- greffion.
The moral capacity we have been fpcaking of, including moral obligation, undeniably proves the internal liberty of mankind. As it implies a rule or guide of life, with authority and fanc- lions, as wc have an inward perception of good
or
5 8 Internal Liherty Mongs "
or ill-defert, according as we have followed, or departed from, the direftion of this leading principle •, fo we could not perceive ourfelves to be under it as a law^ and reproach ourfelves fordifobediencejWcrewc fully pcrfuadedfuch dif- obedience was a matter of real necefTiiy, Wc experieixe, that ' our happinefs or milery is not our fate* — Meaning here by thefe terms, not fo much that kind of happinefs or milery which depends on a man's outward condition and circumftances, as that which we fignify by the words, peace, ferenity^ and joy of heart, on the one hand •, and difquietude of mind, vexation or angiiifh of fpirit on the other. ^{ he good man is fathfied from him [elf, The wicked is like the troubled Jea, when it cannot rejt. Thefe differ- ent and oppofite fenfations, which conftitute our chief happinefs or mifery in this world, and are accompanied more or lefs with hope or fear for fiiturity, it is impofTible we fliould have, were we not internally free. We may fuppofe them to be as ftrong in thofe who are wholly depriv- ed of external freedom, as in thofe who are ful- ly poffeired of it. So that however external ne- c'elluy may wholly prevent our being rewarda- ble or punilhable for the outward adion, it by no means doth for the inward dilpofition, pro- vided this depends on ourfelves. Hence the injunftion. Keep thy heart with all diligence ; for out of it are the ijfues of life. It is in the power of 7nan to lay any external neceflity upon us, but no infernal one. No chains can bind the foul but thofe of our own impofing. The cap- tive, prifoner, i^c, may be as free, in the religi- ous fenfc, as any man. A pcrfon wholly de- prived of his bodily powers of ailion may yet be free in the nobkft fenfc.
- - JST^
to moral jiger.ts', 99
Wfi fhafl now proceed to fnew, that Internal liberty, in finite beings placed upon trial, im- plies an opportunity and capacity of chufin^ and a5ling otherwije than they in fa5l do. Finite be- ings^ we fay •, becaufe we pretend not to know what the perfcfl liberty of the /«/«/;f Being is. ' So far as we are free^ v/e arc not necejfarily de- terminedy fo that we could not hue make the choice we do/
Whether the holy angels ever had a moral ability of falling, we need not enquire ; though we have no ground to determine the contrary. Beings made upright, we know, have revolced. ^ow if the malignity of apoRate fpirits'againit GOD, their unalcerable oppofiiion to him, be the confcquence of perverting a moral power they once had,^ it (hews that finite beings may polTels a liberty of chafing and afting otherwife thaa they do ; andconlequently, that liberty may be diftinguifiied from, and oppofed to, moral ne- cefiity. So with refpeft to apoftate man, if he had originally a moral power of retairving his in- nocence, the inference is, that he poflTefTed liber- ty,not only as oppofed to conftraint from without, but as oppofed to moral necefiity. From the fall of angels and man, the inference therefore is not, that they were morally unable to keep their firflweftate •, but that they had a moral power, and abufed it. Indeed, in the cafe of their firft fin, moral ncccfllty muft have been ftridlly natu- rtf/— Not, as we are won't to call habits, 2. fecond nature, but a /iry? nature. So i\\2X moral ov cri- mind inability fuppofcth a moral power once ^ojfejfed b\M forfeited.
If, on ths coatrary, it be fupngfed, that nei- ' -■ ■ P thcr
ioO Internal Liter fy ielongs
ther man, nor the angels that fell, had a moral ability at firft to continue in a (late of redlitudc, to whom but their Creator muft their fall be at- tributed ? Their original powers were fuch as he endowed them with. They could be required to exert no other. Their abilities, relations, and deftination being fuch as their great Former gave and intended, they could be anfwerable only for ■what was given. If, therefore, the firft a6t of fin * neceflarily followed from GOD's withhold- ing afliftance, or if that afliftance was not afford- ed, which was aUfolutely neceflary to the avoid- ing' the firft tranfgreffion, what is this but mak- ing GOD the proper author of it ? How con- fiftent this is with his moral charadcr, or tbe pojfibility of fin^ we need not fay. But if GOD be the immediate author of the firft a6l of difo- bedience in the creature, he is conltquentially the author of all the moral defilement and inabi- lity proceeding therefrom •, fince ' the firft ad in the train determines and fixes the reft/ So that if 'there is not, and never can be, either in ex- iftence or idea, a freedom from moral necefTity, or a power of felf-determination — if every moral event is immediately or uUimatdy ordered and de- termined by GOD' — (403, 404.)theconrcqucnce is, either that there is not, and never can be, fin in the world ; or if there is, it is wholly chaigea- ble on the firft caufe. The only way to e^pde this confequence is to admit, that the duty of an- gels and man, before their fall, was no other than ihey had a moral as well as natural power to do. To fuppofc their duty exceeded their abi- lities would be the injuftice, which the flothful fcrvant charged his Lord with.
f ROM what hath been iivi^ ic appears, that
(9 mor^l Agents: f©?
there is no need of our examining into any moral impotency dtnvtd irom the fall, or the moral inability of /j//^» man. For Mr. Edwards fup- pofeth this kind of impotenCy to have taken place in innocence, as really as fince the apoftacy. ThaC h, there was a moral necefTity of the firft fin-^ therefore a moral incapacity ©f refraining from it. * And if the moral ntfcefTicy of the firft fin, (though as real, (p. 230) was not in the fame ,4egree with ihatof fubfcqucnt fins ; yet the /;/-
. crea/ed
*♦ Mr. Edwards^ do£lrinemanIfeftly implies a moral inability in man and angels before their fall. He faith he 'has dcmonftrate<J, that the futurity of all events is eftablifhed by previous neceflity, either .natural or moral 5 and that it is manifeft that the fovereign Creator and Difpofer of the world has or- dered this neceflity, by ordering his own cx>ndu<^, either in <lefignedly acting, or forbearing to aft. That the whole feries of events is coone£led with ! fomcthing in the-ftate of things,eitber pofitivc or nega- ,tive, which, is original in ^he feries ; i. e. fomething which is con nc^ed with nothing preceeding that> ;but GOD's own -IMMIDiate condud'— and in re- gard ' to the ftate and a<Sts of the will, every event of this kind is neceflary by a moral neceflity.* — (p. 402, 403, 405, 406) ' The will always has an in- ability to a<Sl otherwifc than it does' ; (p. 35) that is, the man, or agent, or foul-r-'for .the faculty of will doth not a<El, but the agent that hath it.' GOD does decifively in his providence deter- mine all the volitions and ai^ions of moral agents, either by pofitivc influence or permiflion-^-meaning ;by permiflion, not only.' the not'hindering fin, but .difpcTing the ftate and circumftances of things in tfuch a manner, thatfm certainly and infallibly fol- lows from his difpolal — that GOD, when he had made man^fo ordered his c'lrcumfiancei, that from thefi circum/iiincei, together with the withholding divine in^ fumce and ojfijiajice^ hi i fin infallibly follouiidt'' (p. 37 6 J
jt 02 Internal Liherty heUngs
creafed imbecility being a necefTary effeSl of \yhac was original, that is finally to be refolved into thfls ; and this to be attributed to the firft caufe — who made man upright indeed, in his own moral image, but really incapable of re- taining his primitive reditude.
Whatever hath been fuppofed to be the prefenc moral inability of mankind, Calv nii\ic
divints
The firft fin ofangfls and man was then morally necedary, and pfoceec^ed from their origmalftate and circumftanccs— -from GOD's withholding neccffafy pfTiftance. And this proves their original moral inability ; which inability beine; ' connedled with no- thing preceeding, but GOD's own immfdiatE CONDUCT, which is ORIGINAL in the feries^i* he muft be the author of it. For if he himfelf necf^itatcd them to fm, by doing or forbearing what rendered the lirft fin un avoid able ■*~-if fm foliowed from his ordering and difpofal, that n^axim in philofophy is ftri£lly applicable^ ' Caufa dejiciem^ in rebus nutjfa^ riis, ad caufam perfg ejficientem reducenda eji. In things neceiFary, the dehcirnt caufc muit be reduced to the efficient. And in this eale the reafon is evi- dent ; becaufe the not doing what is required, cr not avoiding what is forbidden, rnuft follow from the pcfition of the nectffary caufe of the deficiency.* The moral ncceffitv Mr. ^^tt;<2r*:/j contends for, as it runs up to the firft entrance of fin into the world, fuppofctlr an inability in the time of inno- cence— and that GOD's own immediate conduct is firfl in the feries of caufes ^-and .cfFeefls ; fo to fay , the fifft fin, or any other, was not necefil'.ry by a natural nercfTity, no way relieves the difHculty. For natural liberty depends on moral liberty, by his own principles. Ar-d to fay that ihe fiift caufe and fu- . p.eme orderer of all things made angels and men fo at firft, as that iht'ir original fin became nectfiary in confequence of a moral inability they were created with, is making the fupreme caufe * the proper au-
to moral A^enl^l Ipj
divines have ever maintained, not that it was eriginal^ but confequent ts the /<8//— the judicial animadverfion of the Deity upon the firft of- fence. We are inclined to think Mr. Edwards was in the fame opinion upon the whole, though he haih exprefled himfelt fo as to give full rea- fon for our attributing the contrary to him-— that is, bringing a charge of felf-repugnancy. For Mr. Edwards afferts, that man was ' en- dowed at firft with the moral or fpiritual ' ' '' .- . ^ ^ ' image
thor, the ciEcicnt caufe,* of all the. fins of men and devils. To which objection it is really furprizing to find Mr. Edwards returning this anfwer, that the do6trine of hrs oppofers is involved in the fame dif- ficulty. For admit it to be fo, is this a proper an- fwer ? If either his do6trine or theirs is juftly char- geable with fuch a confequence, by all the regard we owe t® a Deity and moral Governor we arc bound to reje^ a fcheme which contains fuch an imputa- \tion upon him, ^ " - .... - ..... ..
It hence appears, that the cafe Mr. Edwards xn'- ■ftanceth in, * of a man for his rebellion caft into prifon, and loaded with chains, on whom his Prince
i hath compafTion, orders his chains to be knocked off,
' and the prifon doors to be fet open— but who is full { ©f fuch malignity,that he cannot be willing to accept the offer of forgivencfs' — (p. 305, 306) that this, cafe is quite aliene from the purpofc, and no way ap- plicable to Mr. Edwards's do(ftrine. For by his
' principles, there is a neceffity on the minds of men, ftrong as grates of brafs, and bars of iron — which neceffity extends to the firft entrance of fin into the world. Hence the angels that fell, and our commoa progenitors, could not be willing to abide in their pri-
? mitive ftate. Hence finncrs continue impenitent. Internal chains, ftrong as the bars of a caftle bound the morning ftars to revolt from Heaven — bound
'- Adam and Eve to fin — and bind all who ft and out
' againft the gofpel invitation.
%04. Internal Liherty lekngf
image of GOD/ in diftin6lion from his natural image — By the laaer alio he explains himfelf to mean, * an underftanding to perceive the difFe* rence between moral good and evil -, a capacity of difcerningthat moral v^rorchineis and demerit, by v^rhich fome things are praifc-worthy, others deferving of blame and punifhment ; and alfo a iapactty of choice^ and choicr guided by under- ftanding, and a power of a£iing according to choice.* (p. 41, 43^) Consequently, he had a xapaciiy pf making ibis choice, to continue ia the ftate of mor^l rcclicudc wherein he was ere- .ated. <Gonftrq.]ently, a (moral) power of abid- ing in rthat ftcice. Confeqaently, his fall from it was not an event morally neceffary. Confe- .quently,.not .infallibly cmneded with the divine difpofal and determination. Confequently, the fuppofed fixed connexion o^ every moral event with a previous moral caufe, could not antecede the apoftacy, but muft (if real) be fubfequent to it. Confequently, in every fuch event ^ GOD's own immediate, con dud' cannot be fuppofed to be ' original in the feries.' The difficulty ari- fmg from divine prefcicnce we pretend not to be able to clear. It is fufficient that it equals iy lies againft Mr. Edwards's dodtrine.
Upon admitting, with the generality of ,C^1- viniftic divines, /7r/^^'«^/,/»/^''«^/ freedom in man; fhat his moral imbecility was confequent to, and the punifhment of, the firft offence ; that the mo- ral impotency of apoftace fpirits alio is the fruit and effeSl of their revolt •, the moral perfed.ons of GOD are vindicated, and he is freed from ^he impious charge of being the author of >their fin : But how this charge can be removed on the foundationMr. ^Yit'^r^J proceeds upon is difficult
to moral Jgentsl 105
to conceive; nor indeed has he taken much pain^to remove it, though he allows it ' is infinitely to be abhorred, and denies it to be the eonfcquencc of what he has laid down.' In what fenfe he thought It was to be * abhorred,' and will not allow it to be the ' confequencc' of what he hath faid, has been already remarked. * However great that impotency is which mankind derive from y^<^^w,thereis a man ifeft difference beiweea a moral inability or neceflity derived from the fall of man, and a like kind of inability or ne- ceflity original to the human race. Mr. Ed- wardsh dodlrine of neceflity is inconfiftent witfi the opinion of our having loft our power in A-^ dam J fincc he could not hfe a power he never had.
We have but one thing farther to add. While we acknowledge the fallen ftate of our nature, and the impotency derived from the fall, the proper queftion on the gofpel plan is, Whether falvation is offered to finners on pr amicable terms ? The offer prefuppoleth our lofl: and pe- rching ftate. Is it then adapted to this ftate of mankind ? Is there a poffibility of accepting it ? Rather, is there no impropriety, is there not a palpable contradidion, in fpeak- ing of an offt.r on terms known to be morally im- poflible ? The prefent queltion is not, Whether fallen man hath power, independently cf the aids €f grace y to accept the gofpel propofals ? but. Whether fuch afliftances are tendered with the call of the gofpel as that an acceptance of it is morally poffible I
f S^, m Fart iii of theft r^marltt;
io6 Internal Liheriy lehngi
Or fuppofe it morally impoflible, that great numbers, who are externally called by the gof- pcl, (hould accept the invitation of it — fuppofe their final condemnation to be juft notwith- ftanding, in conlequence of their relation to Adam^ and the moral inability derived from him ; yet who will fay that they merit a forer punilhment, x greater damnation, when their re- je6ling the gofpel is fuppofed to be the necelTa- ry confequence of GOD*s withholding that af- Jifiance^ without which they can no: embrace it ? A propofal of pa'rdon and life to rebels againft heaven, on impraiticable terms, sc.ompanied with' a threatening of aggravated condemna- tion, feems hardly reconcileable with the difco-^ vcries GOD hath mauc of himfelf as having Hiewn the exceeding riches of his grace inCHRL'i^r JESUS — Not zvitting any Jhculd perifl:^ but that f.li PiOuld come to repentance — Cofnmanding all men every where to ? epent — tVhotvcr will, let him come^ and take the waters of life freely,
-ir may be faid, ' True indeed, whofoever will \ci him come. We grant, if they have a will, they may come. But we afTcrr, that none but fuch as a61ually come can will to come.* Now what faith the fcripture ? When our Savi- our upbraids the Jews, ' Ye will not come to' me that ft might have life/ doth this imply that it was forever morally impoflible for chcm to haVeiome ? or doth it fuppofe, on the contrary, thal'they might have willed to come ? Why clf<; are they upbraided for not coming ? Hovr oft would he have gathered them, but they would not ^ Was there not a time, therefore, when they might have known the things belong- ing to ihcir peace ? 1 la before you life and
deaths
to moral Agents, 107
death, bleffing and curfing ; therefore chusb life — implying a moral capacity oi cbufing as well as CDYidutling according to choice : And indeed, without fuppofing the former, how caa the latter be faid to be in any one's power ? It is fo only in confequence of volition or choice. If the caufe be out of our. power, the effect mud be ofcourfe. Befides, * the very willing or chu* fing is the doing : When once a man hath wil- led or chofen, the thing is done,' Had not thac fervant, who received the fingie talent, a moral power to have improved that talent well ? In confequence of fuch improvement, would he not have received more ? According to thar> ' To him that hath, fhall be given,' ^c. Was he not condemned out of his own mouth ?
Let us add here, that the fuppofition of (in- ners being abandoned and given up of GO D, im- plies, that they once had a moral power to turn and live — Always remembering to include the means and influences of grace when we fpeak of fuch a power. For it is GOD that worketh in us to will and to DO ^ which is the argument to ou'c work- ing out our own f ah at ion. Doth not the demand of the Prophet, What could have been done more, to my vineyard ? imply that means and influen- ces on GOD*s part are afforded, or tendered, in fuch meafure to finners, as renders their compli- ance with the terms of falvation poffible at lead ? We have, indeed, no warrant to fay abfolutely, that he could not have done more for the con- vcrfion of the Jews — that he could not have converted them by an immediate, irrefiftible in- fluence. He that ' is able to raife up children to Abraham out of the ftones,* could, no doubt, have done this, had he k^i^i fit. it is enough
loS Internal Liherty belongs &c,
that the means ufed with them were ftffficient, though not unconquerable.
But we may difmifs this matter. Mr. Ed' wards'^ do6lrine is, that the Jirji fin of angels and man as was r^^/Zy neccfTary, as the wickednefs of abandoned (inners and apoftate fpirits — So that what hath been laft obferved, relating to the neceffity of the fins of fallen creatures, while on probation, and in the time of GOD's grace and vifitation, no way affedls our main argu- ment. Mr. Edwards hath offered a chain of feafoning in proof that man hath in no cafe, and never had, a power of fc If- determination ; but is, and always was, determined by a moral necef- fiiy^ which neceffity is as real as any other. This riecedity, he affirms, belongs to all finite beings, and to the Creator himfelf— At the fame time he hath taken great pains to (hew, that it is con* lilknc with the moft perfedl liberty.
SECT,
S E C T. IL
. Internal moral liberty^ as dijlin^ from e^iernaly confiftent with the influence of motives, and ufe of commands^ exhortations^ promifes^ warnings^ threateningSy &c.
WE readily grant, there can be no a6l of choice without feme motive or induce- .ment. But if what hath been obferved, with relpe6t to the power of creatures made uprighc to retain or forfeit their innocence. Be admitted, it clearly follows, that the application of com- mands, invitations, monitions, &c. is confiftent with a freedom to either fide. For who quefti- ons but rebel angels had the higheft induce- niems, before their fall, to abide in their firft eftate ? We need not fcruple to fay, the ftrong- eft pofTible motives could not be wanting in the prefence of GOD — that it was the higheil apparent good, as well as their higheft duty, and what they had a moral ability for, to continue fubjedl to the great Creator. And it is really one of themofl inexplicable events, that beings in their fituation fhould fall. This event fhews, beyond queftion, that a liberty to either fide is -confiftent with the moft powerful motives to bi- as and incline the will to one fide.
So in the cafe of innocent Adam, no one mil /ay, that the motives in paradife, to hold faft his jnteority, were infufficient— or that their noc proving effeaual necefiarily proceeded from the
..original
ijfy Infer ml moral Liherty^
original, moral (tate of his will, pOiTeiTed of the moral image of GOI?. That he had a moral capacity to fuftain the federal trial is here taken for granted. Among other commands, writ- ten on -his heart, or communicated by fpecial intercourfe with Deity, he had one prohibition properly pofitive, which was made the teft of hiS fidelity, acccmpanied with an exprefs threat, that he fhould die in cafe ot npn -forbearance in that in (la nee -, and implying a promife of life, if he refrained in this article. Whatever be un- dcrftood by the death threatened, the threaten- ing was lufficiently awful. Yet againfl: the cleared warning, againft the higheil motives to the contrary,he veLtnred to take and eat. Com- mands, invitations, prom/ifes, admonitions, &:c. are therefore confiitent with a moral ability tp hearken or not hearken to them.
For the fame reafon that yF;^ couM not be mp- rally necefiaryat firft^ it will be difficult to prove, that the CQ.n{\Ti\:itd holinefs of good angels vyas morally neceflary from the beginning. Mr. Ed- .ivards Teems to fuppofe a difference as to the degree of m.oral neceffity i but exprefsly main- tarns, that the reality of it is the fame in all in- fiances. * That is to fay, though every act of every creature is certain and fixed decifively be- forehand, yet there are different degrees of ab- iolute certainty.
Farther, with regard to fallen man, Mr. Edwards allows, that commands, &c. are given to, and means ufed with finners, in unregene- racy. From hence he partly argues his dodrine
» Part III. Sea. iHcu
'cdtififtenf with the influence of Motive. 1 1 i
of neceflity. f They have a moral underfland- ing, and the fame natural powers of adtion, with lioiy and good men — To which end moral ior duGcmcnts of various kinds are laid before them.
The doflrine of necefraryconne6i:ion of means and ends, as ftated by Mr. Edwards^ implies one or other of the following things : Either that no means are employed with the unrcgenerate in order to their converfion — or none that have a tendency to the end — or that they have not a .moral power of ufing them — or their ufe of thenti is certainly and infallibly fuccefsful.
That means are ufed with unregenerate fin- fiers^ Mr. Edwards grants. But fince the doc- trine he defends may feem to imply, that means are never ufed with the .finally impenitent, (at lead not to bring them to repentance, but only to confirm them in wickednefs, and lead them todcftrudion) we fhall juft hint, that the whole ceconomy of providence and grace is a means ufed with the righteous, and wicked in common, for the canfirmation, improvement and comforc of the former^ and convidion and reformation of the latter. Extraordmary and ordinary means are ufed tbvthls end. Of the former kind are miracles, prophecy, tongues, vouchHifed at fpe- cial feafons, and in divers manners -, together .with fingular and alarming interpofitions of pro- vidence. To the latter kind belong a written, {landing revelation, a public miniilry and infti- tutions of worfhip, the drivings of the divine fpirit, various providential allotments &c. The .word of truth in particular is an external ap- pointed
t Ibid, and Se£t. 7. and p. 384..
ij 12 Unterml moral Lihertyp
pointed means of regeneration, repentance from ■dead works, converfion, or that faith by whicK thofe live who are pafied from death to life. If any reject the tender of (alvation, the meffen- gers of it are diredled to wipe off the duli of their feet as a teftimony againfl the defpifers of their mcffage^ leaving with them this foleinn proteftation, ' Be ye fure of this, that the king- dom of GOD is come unto you.' We might mention the patience of GOD towards fmners, g^c. — v;hence it is apparent that